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EDITOR'S NOTE:

The map of Africa joined those of the Balkans and the former Soviet Union as essential guides to the bewildering array of conflicts that make up the daily news fare. Yet, as with most things African, the conflicts on that continent have failed to receive detailed attention—except for Somalia. The once obscure nation that only attracted the notice of cold war geostrategists (a species not known for the humanitarian impulse) was thrust into public conscience after much hand-wringing in the media about the lack of concern with Somalia's famine and general state entropy while the Bosnian atrocity received intense scrutiny. The resulting deployment of a United States force of more than 20,000 has opened debate on what the American role should be on the rest of the continent. Long-time African observer Robert Rotberg summarizes that debate and expands it to include structural issues that the United States should address to help ensure Africa's long-term stability and development.

Somalia is also the starting point for Rakiya Omaar's and Alex de Waal's analysis of the international aid community's response to the Somali crisis. They find that a "philanthropic imperialism" undergirds the relief agencies' agendas not only in Somalia but in the third world in general. Their explanation of how this has come to be and why it has negative consequences should fuel another, more complex debate about the Somalia operation.

The other Somalia in the making, Sudan, is discussed by Khalid Medani, and a country that bears all the marks of the failed Somali state, Liberia, is the subject of William O'Neill's essay. John Marcum traces the path that has led to renewed fighting in Angola, and Shawn McCormick reviews why Mozambique has managed to avoid a similar fate—so far. We end with Kenneth Grundy's somewhat pessimistic picture of the transition process in South Africa.

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"The Clinton administration has an unparalleled opportunity to focus on broad, functional initiatives in Africa. If our policy can rise above the usual day-to-day fire-fighting, if we can begin to address... the development of popular democratic political values... if we can... help transform the evil empire of apartheid into the benevolent economic powerhouse of the continent, then we can be certain that a new and beneficent era will have finally arrived for Africa and for the United States in Africa."

The Clinton Administration and Africa

BY ROBERT I. ROTBERG

The ferment afflicting sub-Saharan Africa is unprecedented. Not since 1960 has the continent been in such flux, and not since pre-colonial times—and not even during the Congo crises of the early 1960s—has violence so convulsed it.

The turmoil that has become endemic to modern Africa presents enormous challenges to the new administration in Washington. Freed from cold war shackles, President Bill Clinton can concentrate on the spread of participatory government, the encouragement of progressive attitudes toward human rights, the satisfaction of basic human needs, the rebuilding of economies, family planning, environmental education and improvement, and—hardly least—the prevention of civil conflicts.

This lengthy and incomplete list of the primary tasks of United States policy in sub-Saharan Africa is an agenda of quiet desperation. Given the wars that are causing policymakers to focus on state collapse and ethnic irredentism in the Balkans and Central Asia, and given the White House's natural focus on Russia, Israel, and economic competition with Asia, African questions will remain second order. Moreover, health care, the deficit, and a host of other compelling domestic concerns will leave little time for anything African aside from disasters like Somalia—and perhaps Zaire and Liberia—and the transition in South Africa. Foreign aid will remain inadequate; anything the

United States seeks to accomplish in sub-Saharan Africa must be done on the cheap.

Africa hands in Washington and beyond the Beltway are familiar with these handicaps. They also know how much needs to be done in and for Africa, and how critical these next years will be for the continent in terms of demographic growth, government stability, the battle against AIDS, conflict minimization, and the creation of a meaningful post-apartheid framework in South Africa.

CONFLICT: WHEN TO SAY WHEN

Of the world's 30 or so civil wars or similar conflicts, 13 are in Africa: Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Zaire, Togo, Cameroon, Angola, Chad, the Casamance region of Senegal, South Africa, Rwanda, Eritrea/Ethiopia, and Mozambique (the last two in abeyance for the moment). Kenya too may soon implode, and economic conditions in Zambia are sufficiently rough that the army could revolt. When President Hastings Kamuzu Banda goes, Malawi could also become a serious trouble spot.

The administration of President George Bush finally decided to send troops to Somalia in December to prevent further killing and starvation after an infernal year of anarchy there. Despite the misgivings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a few experts on the region, the separation of the warring clans in Mogadishu—closely watched by the international news media—proved easy. The delivery of relief supplies took a little longer, as did the partial pacification of cities and villages in the interior.

Even if, as planned, the United Nations successfully

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assumes control of the Somali operation, with marines remaining offshore on their ships, the dilemma of Somalia's future will remain. Under the UN umbrella, should and can the United States thoroughly pacify and disarm the country? Given American responsibilities in a unipolar world, the United States may be deemed to have a moral obligation as well as a significant self-interested motive for removing the killing potential in Somalia, although total pacification is probably impossible. Carrying out such a mission, however, would mean confiscating the armaments of all Somalis and remaining as a quasi-occupying force.

Washington and the UN will be uncomfortable with an operation for long-term pacification. And who will pay? But Somalia cannot soon be left to itself. We should have ended the clan warfare earlier, and cannot now justify letting the country and its people slide back into warlordism and rule by guns. To do so would unnecessarily swell the ranks of Africans sunk in misery and undermine our global policy of democratization.

How to introduce (more accurate than "return") Somalia to participatory government becomes the central question for the United States and the UN. It can become an issue for Somalis alone only when their country enjoys civil order and sufficient supplies of food. A resumption of trusteeship (Somalia was a UN trust territory between 1946 and 1960) may be too stiff and threatening for Somalis or African leaders to accept, yet a period of "tutelage" will be important. Can our policymakers understand that other options are few? The United States may need to shoulder the bulk of the burden—but preferably through the UN.

We need to develop a separate policy for the northern half of Somalia. Formerly British Somaliland, the north was a colonial territory from 1869 to 1960, when the Trust Territory of Somalia (once an Italian colony) voted to join the British half to create Somalia. The clan allegiances of the north are different from those in the south; the warlordism and most of the fighting and famine have been confined to the southern half. Recognition of Somaliland would restore its autonomy and limit the extent of the problem of Somalia.

If the Organization of African Unity has problems with this un-drawing of the borders of postcolonial Africa, we should persuade it that the interclan violence of the south does not allow any better alternative. Certainly, too, the bad blood among clans that became more and more decisive as President Siad Barre's dictatorial rule of Somalia deteriorated would be exacerbated if the north and the south, were forcibly re-yoked. In this case common language is a weak glue, incapable of holding the fissiparous parts of a failed state together.

If the United States has intervened in Somalia to save lives and create order out of anarchy, why not elsewhere in Africa? Clearly one answer is a practical one: the costs of being a forcible peacemaker even for the African world alone would be intolerable and almost unceasing. There would be telling domestic political consequences. Our military and political leadership hardly wants to be sucked into one after another of myriad local conflicts. America is also trying to live down its reputation as an interventionist in another hemisphere. It makes obvious sense, however, for us to be involved in African conflicts as a mediator, and we have been, successfully, in Namibia, and more recently, with less immediate success, in Liberia and Angola. As some of those efforts fail, what then is our responsibility? And what is in the national interest of the United States?

What of Sudan, where two Christian/animist movements based in the southern part of the country, one led by an American-educated economist, have long sought autonomy and basic human rights from the intolerant Muslim fundamentalist government? At what point does the denial of relief shipments to refugees from the south constitute "ethnic cleansing"? At what point does repression by the Muslim north of whole populations and rebels in the south become illegitimate?

Can we care any less for Sudan or Liberia than for Somalia? In all three nations innocent civilians are being killed and denied basic human rights. Washington, alone or in concert with the UN, has an interest in containing violence so Africans can develop their economies, produce their own food rather than rely on relief from abroad, and make their own cases for political participation and possibly for autonomy peacefully, combating intolerance and oppression successfully without war.

The civil war in Sudan is hardly fresh, having broken out in 1983 against the government that preceded the current military junta. But the animosities between south and north go back at least to nineteenth-century Arab slave raids in the south. Throughout the cold war the United States backed the regime of General Gaafar Nimeiri and refused to help John Garang's Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army. Now, after the cold war and after Somalia, the claims of some of Africa's most desperate freedom fighters are hard to deny.

Resolution of the Sudanese conflict must be placed high on the American agenda and that of the UN. Yet unless the atrocities that have marked the civil war receive greater publicity, it will be hard to justify forceful intervention. Moreover, our leverage on the regime in Khartoum is nil; only Iran may be able to persuade the northern Sudanese to use the bargaining table rather than guns to end the conflict.

MORE TROUBLE: LIBERIA, ANGOLA, ZAIRE

If the Nigerian-led seven-nation West African military force that occupies much of the Liberian capital of Monrovia and some of the hinterland were not in place, Charles Taylor's deadly attempt to play warlord would merit United States intervention to save lives and end anarchy. Even now we may want to help the West African force logistically; otherwise the Liberian imbroglio promises to drag on and on, despite high-level American mediation.

We have also attempted to mediate in Angola, where last year the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) refused to accept the results of national elections and resumed fighting its long war against the government. We care deeply about oil production in the enclave of Cabinda, and want the electoral process concluded so Angola may begin the transformation from war to peaceful production. In the end, the United States may have to consider intervening to effect the removal of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, a former American client and successful rebel against the previously Marxist government. As a signatory to the 1991 Angolan peace accords and as the only power with the muscle to assist the completion of the transition to peace, Washington may well want to swallow hard and intervene just long enough to remove another warlord. But that intervention need not be military; Savimbi derives support from outside his country, and we could be a party to cutting off that backing.

Likewise Zaire. Mobutu Sese Seko was a noncommissioned officer in the nascent army of Congo when the United States used him in 1965 to stabilize the country and neutralize Marxist-leaning Patrice Lumumba. In the decades since then, Mobutu has systematically robbed Zaire. If Belgium, France, Switzerland, and the United States block his overseas bank accounts, it will be much harder for Mobutu to continue to prevent participatory government within his vast land. Already his government barely exists in the provinces. The army terrorizes Kinshasa but the remainder of the country is almost devoid of official attention.

It is profoundly in the national interest of the United States that Zaire once again function as a state. Thus it is important to remove Mobutu so that we and the UN can attempt to play a part in the reconstruction—and just possibly the democratization—of the country.

These conflicts, and others like that in Togo, indicate the importance of a steady policy for sub-Saharan Africa that contemplates the creation of an early warning system that might prevent civil wars and other kinds of ethnic, racial, and religious clashes in the fragile states of Africa. Our policymakers need to prepare for the outbreak of conflict that could be sparked by the succession crisis in Malawi, the transi-

tion from the rule of General André Kolingba in the Central African Republic, and especially by the irruption of ethnic-based conflict in Kenya.

Perhaps then we will be caught a little less flat-footed than we were in Somalia and Liberia. In the post-cold war world we need to develop limits to state aggression against minorities. We need to think through policies that will encourage mediation, UN assistance and periods of tutelage, and our own involvement, limited or otherwise. African conflicts will not vanish by themselves.

DEMOCRATIZATION: FIND THE PRESSURE POINTS

The United States wants to minimize war and encourage participatory politics so that all Africans can involve themselves as directly as possible in their own rule. Corruption and zero-sum government bedevil Africa, flourishing as they do in the absence of meaningful participatory processes. America's National Endowment for Democracy initiatives in training, our sponsorship of elections and election-monitoring, and our jaw-boning about democracy are all valuable. So too would be the provision of incentives for leaders and followers to welcome further experiments in genuine democratization.

Botswana has been a democratic model since it gained independence in 1966. Individual leadership was more important than national character in sustaining democracy there—as it is proving to be in Namibia, Senegal, and possibly in Zambia, Ghana, and a few other states. Washington needs to learn what contributes to successful and enduring participatory experiences in Africa, and hone its new incentives accordingly.

We can do more to train incipient democrats and jurists in places as desperate as Zaire, Liberia, and even Nigeria. Doing so in a timely fashion in Mozambique is critical. President Clinton might well take to the bully pulpit to encourage Africans to insist their leaders request such training and then live up to the new ideals.

The cold war encouraged the United States to compromise its principles of liberty and freedom for anti-Communist objectives; now we can resume our unquestioned support for those—in nongovernment organizations as well as governments—who foster human rights and participation. Likewise, we can abjure formal relations with dictators, leaders of military juntas, and all those who rule by terror.

Angola is a case in point. The recognition denied it during the cold war is long overdue. Given its electoral success in a poll reasonably well sanctioned by the UN and foreign observers, the government of President José Eduardo dos Santos ought to be treated in a manner that will encourage Angolans to continue to take part in politics.

We wisely put pressure on Kenya and Malawi in

1991 and 1992 to permit at least a degree of popular political participation. With Washington supporting the efforts of groups of Western donors, Kenya's Daniel arap Moi and Malawi's Banda were induced to permit the formation of opposition political parties. Kenya even held a full-scale national election, and Malawi may also hold one. Likewise, the United States joined France and other former colonial powers in encouraging the devolution of power in many of the countries of the Francophone sphere; Niger had an election, and others are scheduled.

Nor is this the end of that kind of involvement. We will want to continue to put economic pressure on those heads of state who hesitate to permit open displays of the popular will. We may even need to watch Nigeria carefully as it attempts this year to make a successful transition from military to democratic government.

Kenya and Ghana (which has also held an election) are still in the throes of accommodation with the people. The succession in Ivory Coast remains questionable. We will have many opportunities to act; but it is the policy of accepting very little less than participatory rule that should be articulated, elaborated on, and insisted on.

TAKING JUSTICE'S SIDE IN SOUTH AFRICA

Having emerged from the tragic slough of apartheid, South Africa is poised to re-create itself as a multiracial condominium. The white regime of President F. W. de Klerk has finally understood that the country's future depends on meeting the justified and long forcibly stifled political, social, and economic demands of 30 million black Africans (in a population of 40 million growing at 3.6 percent a year).

Likewise, Nelson Mandela and the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) have come to appreciate, both strategically and tactically, that the shortest route to undiluted black power is through some accommodation of white fears and greed, not through the barrel of a gun. Sometime later this year, members of the ANC will join what will become a transitional government. There will be elections to a constituent assembly that will write a new constitution and, at least in theory, govern for five years.

The United States should continue to forward the process by training those who will organize elections, govern, and run enterprises. We need to help train black jurists, black journalists, and black teachers of all kinds. Given the dearth (thanks to apartheid) of black professionals, we must find ways of aiding South Africa as it emerges from bitter inequality and societal deprivation.

A bigger task for the United States will be to assist all South Africans in focusing squarely on making power sharing succeed. Much of the optimism of 1993 reflects the calculating sensibilities of a handful of

leaders; others will attempt to sabotage compromises arrived at by those leaders, and the road to success can be easily mined. The United States should use its public and private influence to encourage only those developments forged in a real spirit of compromise. We need to be a positive broker, and to remain as engaged as the parties in South Africa will allow.

We also have a special obligation: to do as much (which may not be much) as an outsider can to halt the corrosive violence between supporters of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's regional Inkatha Freedom party and the mainstream African National Congress. Increasingly, Inkatha is marginalized by the growing concordat between the ANC and the white government. Hence Chief Buthelezi's desperation and, to a large extent—whether still stoked by white-sponsored gun-running and funds or not—the continuing battles between blacks in the ghettos and townships of South Africa.

We can take sides. We can favor peace and accommodation. We can bestow praise and assistance on processes that are incipiently democratic without being audaciously confrontational. We can also pour as much money as we can find into the desperately impoverished schools of black South Africa. Only 40 percent of all black secondary school students pass their final comprehensive examinations, as opposed to 98 percent of whites. Once funded at one-tenth the level of white students, in recent years black schoolchildren have been underfunded merely by a ratio of 1 to 4. The new, to-be-unified South African educational system will eventually shift priorities, but for years to come there will simply be too little money to redress the wrongs and warped policies of generations. The United States can target teacher training, special kinds of magnet schools, postsecondary technical education, or similar niches.

Whatever the Clinton administration can do will hardly be enough. Furthermore, the South African transition will be a long one, and will be achieved only with great pain. We need to stay engaged; there is no more formidable or more critical issue for America in Africa, or for the future of all Africa.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

United States policymakers are accustomed to crafting creative responses to troubles in African countries. They appreciate the importance of conflict resolution; they have actively supported the democratization of Francophone Africa and similar developments in many English-speaking states. But foreign policy and foreign aid establishments are impelled to action more by emergencies than by issues that require long-term planning. Washington gives less thought than it might to some of the overriding concerns for the continent's future.

In addition to developing successful procedures to

prevent widespread arms transfers, which create more violence than might otherwise exist and result in cases like Somalia and Liberia, the United States and other Western nations now need to think constructively about ways to relieve overborrowing and debt repayment crises, about the enhancement of food production, and about the development of efficient methods of collecting meaningful statistical information (on demographic variables, trade, rainfall, disease incidence, and so on).

These and many other areas call for American attention—and not only from a small office in the Agency for International Development. One of the key challenges is population planning. The policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations were disastrous for family planning in Africa. Now, when Africa's rampant population growth is at last beginning to moderate, American assistance, funds distributed directly or through the UN, and a general climate of helpfulness will be critical. Annual population growth rates still average more than 3.2 percent, and soar as high as 4.2 percent a year for Kenya, equivalent to a doubling of population every 16 years. We should work through and with nongovernment organizations in each African country, through International Planned Parenthood, and through state-run agencies in many sub-Saharan nations. No other disbursements and no other actions will have as much impact on the economic expansion of Africa (including South Africa), on responses to drought and other climatic changes, on health costs, and on the ability of Africa to manage to sustain itself over time.

AIDS is rampant in much of eastern and central Africa, and has spread decisively to the south. It has not yet, however, had a dramatic effect on current or long-term trends in population growth. The United States, moreover, has done less than it could (in its own interest as well as to satisfy humanitarian impulses) to help Africa combat AIDS. It is high time the State Department and the White House together fashioned new policies toward AIDS in Africa, as well as ones that will help the continent manage its problems of population growth.

The United States is good at disaster relief. We distribute surplus food efficiently and set up tent encampments well. But we have been less successful at preventing disasters, at assisting Africa itself to cope with climate-induced crises and to plan for sustainability, at educating ourselves and Africans about dangers to the environment, and at building capacities in our own foreign policy and nongovernment establishments for the identification and analysis of these and similar areas of concern.

The trees of much of Africa have long ago been cut down for firewood (Ethiopia, for example, has lost 90 percent of its remaining forest cover in the last 30 years). Where tree cover retreats, erosion follows. The

burden of grazing goats, sheep, and cattle on the land is heavier with each generation; populations that are doubling every few decades heighten the pressure to intolerable levels. Desertification is inexorable on the southern flanks of the Sahara and on the edges of the Kalahari. The beautiful slopes of the Drakensberg Mountains in Lesotho, and the Aberdare Range in western Kenya, are eroding at frighteningly rapid rates.

Today the vanishing tree cover of Africa should be as important to United States policymakers as vicious conflicts. Both deprive Africans of an opportunity to prosper. Prevention is obviously less expensive and better for the peoples of Africa, and therefore for Americans, than expensive—and sometimes impossible—remedies. In a unipolar world there is no escape. For example, saving the remaining forests of Africa and encouraging reforestation may do as much for the long-term health of the continent, its water supplies, tourist industries, and overall economic stability as building expensive new infrastructure, adding to educational capacities, or other equally worthy humanitarian endeavors.

Africa is short of groundwater for humans, livestock, and crops. Its rains are often uncertain, unharnessed, or poorly distributed. Irrigation is too expensive for most subsistence cultivators. Thus another area of initiative for United States policymaking is how best to provide future water supplies for Africa, how to use existing resources more effectively, and how to conserve current supplies. Again, action in this realm over the medium term may be more important than the immediate management of crises.

Americans have learned that pollution costs. As we attempt to reduce the extent of our own degradation of the planet, it is clearly in our interest to encourage Africans to pollute their countries and ours less and less. Africans may argue that developing countries cannot afford not to pollute—to do what Americans did when their industries were younger. But one of the aims of our diplomatic approach to Africa should be to discourage pollution of all kinds, and where necessary, to provide incentives. The cost to all of us will ultimately be less.

In this era after the cold war, the Clinton administration has an unparalleled opportunity to focus on broad, functional initiatives in Africa. If our policy can rise above the usual day-to-day fire-fighting, if we can begin to address the prevention as well as the dampening of conflict, the development of popular democratic political values as much as making the best of whatever regimes are anointed, if we can assist Africa in avoiding the environmental mistakes of the developed north, and help transform the evil empire of apartheid into the benevolent economic powerhouse of the continent, then we can be certain that a new and beneficent era will have finally arrived for Africa and for the United States in Africa. ■

"It is not surprising that a century of international famine relief attempts has proved largely ineffectual. The whole business is being driven by the wrong considerations—at root by the need of the Western political conscience to be able to assuage itself by 'saving' far-off, nameless people. . . . As long as famine relief is entrusted to international charities, famine will continue."

Doing Harm by Doing Good? The International Relief Effort in Somalia

BY ALEX DE WAAL AND RAKIYA OMAAR

Somalia is a dream come true for aid agencies. They are the government. It is a free for all in which they can do anything. There is no accountability, no system, no national counterparts, no one to argue with. Somalis are now powerless. We have no leverage. We have to put up with a lot of [expl.] from foreign expatriates, most of them extremely young. They feel they are indispensable, reinforced by the weakness of Somalis. You get the impression this is the situation they have always wanted.

These words were spoken by Abdilatif Yunis, a Somali doctor working in Mogadishu. He is one of thousands of experienced Somali professionals whose existence has been largely ignored by Somalia's de facto government—the aid agencies, the United States-led multinational forces, and the United Nations.

The absence of a central government in Somalia highlights the extraordinary powers that American and European relief workers have come to acquire in third world countries. Their role in war-ravaged Mozambique has already been the subject of some controversy. But rarely in modern history has the fate of an entire nation appeared to be almost entirely in the hands of relief groups. Indeed, pressure from a handful of United States agencies played a crucial role in triggering Operation Restore Hope, the largest deployment of United States troops in Africa.

The extremely close relations between the United States military and some of the United States relief agencies, particularly CARE and the Los Angeles-based International Medical Corps, has worried Somalis and a number of foreign observers. During the two decades

when Mohamed Siad Barre laid Somalia to waste, the relief groups kept silent, arguing that they could not "meddle" in politics. Now, without consulting Somalis, they prompted and then welcomed a foreign invasion. Many Somalis are asking whether the American relief agencies are the representatives of "humanitarian international," or the vanguard of the United States military.

Relief organizations warrant close scrutiny. Called private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in the United States and nongovernment organizations in Europe, such labels disguise the hidden—and growing—power of these groups. In 1992, they channeled more aid to the third world than the World Bank. They handled a half-million tons of food aid, and were a major influence on the policies of poor governments from Cambodia to Angola. They have a prominent public image. Their propaganda portrays them as angels of mercy who have come to save helpless victims, which allows them to raise tens of millions of dollars from ordinary citizens, and hundreds of millions from governments, for their philanthropy.

THE SOMALI EXAMPLE

In 1991 and 1992, the years of Somalia's slide toward violence and a merciless famine, relief workers were the sole representatives of the international community in Somalia. They were largely responsible for the way in which the country and its people were portrayed in the international media; they determined its relations with the rest of the world (save its immediate neighbors); and they were the sole conduit for foreign assistance.

The imposition of United States troops on Somalia in December 1992 may prove to be a moment of truth for Western voluntary agencies. Before the troops landed, some agencies were enthusiastic supporters of the operation; some were opposed; and others held a

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range of opinions in between. Often, there was a discrepancy between the views of experienced staff on the ground and senior staff at headquarters, who are more vulnerable to political pressure and more sensitive to fund-raising concerns at home. In the end, all went along with the intervention.

Meanwhile, in the United States, an extraordinary public mood of uncritical support was created that bordered on jingoism. Serious debate about the issues raised by this leap into the unknown became difficult. The United States government was doing "something" about the starving people of this faraway country. The virtue of this action was not to be questioned.

Apologists for the United States adventure in Somalia will argue that it overcame a famine. This is wrong. It was abundantly clear at the time that the famine was almost over when the troops pushed inland from Mogadishu. One of the force's unexpected problems was counseling soldiers bewildered by the absence of masses of starving people. By the time he was forced to resign as special UN envoy in late October after publicly criticizing the UN for its slow response to the crisis, Mohamed Sahnoun was already recommending a halt to massive food imports. Excellent rainfall meant that a good harvest was expected for January. Rain and the tenacity of Somali farmers ended the famine, not foreign intervention.

But, even if famine relief was delivered, this type of operation is not the answer to the problem of hunger, in Somalia or elsewhere. Successful famine relief lies in an entirely different direction. The conquest of famine in India and in a handful of African countries such as Botswana, was based on democratic accountability. In these countries, famine is a *political* issue. When famine appears imminent, it is a matter of urgent concern to journalists, trade unionists, and voters, and hence to members of parliament, the civil service, and the government. Giving famine a political sting is the secret to its conquest.

This is the opposite of the apolitical, "humanitarian" message of international relief agencies. For these organizations famine is a human disaster, not a political scandal; launching a famine relief program is a matter for self-congratulation, not shame. In Somalia, international famine relief has become a mechanism for the massive disempowerment of people, which has undermined the country's already battered civic structures. This is not an anomaly; it is a logical extension of an international famine relief system that is dependent on a portrayal of famine victims as powerless and dependent.

The inability of United Nations agencies to pre-empt or respond adequately to humanitarian emergencies is now widely recognized. In Somalia the absence of the UN and most bilateral donors obliged PVOs to run vast programs far beyond their normal capacity. Are the PVOs right to step in to bridge the gap left by the UN's negligence? Should they concentrate their efforts on

advocacy, trying to goad the international relief system into action? The answer is that, since they have been thrust unwillingly into the front line, the PVOs must take on both responsibilities. They are in an unprecedentedly powerful situation because the UN has performed so dismally.

PVOs have gained influence over vast food aid programs and acquired budgets equal to those of the governments of some small, poor countries. In the process, large PVOs have sacrificed the independence that was once their hallmark. This is a worldwide trend, though some agencies like Oxfam (UK) have put a ceiling on the proportion of their funds that come from government.

Where PVOs are truly effective, however, is not in the third world—but at home. They have enormous influence over the media. If Oxfam or CARE says that there is an emergency in Seychelles, then, for journalists throughout Europe and the United States, there is an emergency in Seychelles. If the agencies play their role rightly, Seychelles will get aid—not just from the PVOs but, far more importantly, from the United Nations, the United States, and the European Community. The amount of aid "unlocked" using the media is far in excess of what the entire PVO community could provide.

PVOs are, however, more efficient and flexible than the large UN agencies and government departments, their main competitors in the delivery of aid. Somalia has shown UN agencies for what they are: slow and cumbersome, paralyzed by bureaucratic infighting, and extraordinarily inept on the ground. The UN specialized agencies, including UNICEF and the World Health Organization, could have prevented the Somali disaster from getting out of control, but chose not to.

But can the private voluntary organizations overcome the problems inherent in the disaster relief business? Some of the qualities they bring to bear are certainly impressive: the volunteer ethic and courage. Their willingness to disregard national sovereignty and bend international rules makes them flexible. Many of these agencies, particularly those that channel their funds through local partners and do not run high-profile projects staffed by expatriates, also have a deserved reputation for working closely with local initiatives in the countries in which they are involved. The best of the relief agencies represent the ideals of human compassion and are a forceful expression of international solidarity.

STRIPPING AWAY THE IMAGE

Yet the image of these positive qualities can deceive. Mother Teresa of Calcutta may be a contemporary saint, but the impact of her projects on the wider problems of India's poor warrants scrutiny—she is intensely disliked by self-help organizations in the Indian shantytowns, who argue her efforts have created aid dependency. In the same way, the extraordinarily

powerful myths generated by international charitable action need to be stripped away. Voluntary agencies are professionals primarily in the area of fundraising, which requires them to maintain the images they have created. Because their intentions are manifestly good, it is tempting to accept what they say in their advertisements in a way that we would never do, for example, with commercial companies.

For a range of reasons, voluntary agencies also escape press criticism. In Somalia, as in other famine zones, international journalists are hosted and guided by relief agency staff. Correspondents take their analysis, their quotes, and their hospitality from aid agencies; they trust them, assume they are objective, and socialize with them. Talking to other Westerners is also easier than seeking out the views of local people who may not speak a European language or provide a simple, accessible story with usable sound bites. For the media, a disaster story must have a simple plot, and that plot inevitably requires saviors, especially saviors the West can identify with.

Voluntary agencies can be inefficient and incompetent. Every aid worker has tales of elementary blunders that waste tens of thousands of dollars. Their staffs can be overpaid and corrupt. Moreover, few professions in the world give young and inexperienced volunteers the visibility, clout, and access to decision makers. A young volunteer can earn a professional-level salary, with perks such as free housing (with servants), a four-wheel-drive car, generous vacations, and hardship allowances. A recent college graduate may be put in charge of a program, directing the efforts of local counterparts who are far more experienced and qualified, and who are paid a mere fraction. Abdi, for example, is the most senior Somali in a large United States relief organization. He is a graduate of a Western university. He shares an office with a young expatriate whose resume he reviewed and whom he is supposed to supervise. He has far more field experience than his younger colleague. "Yet," commented Abdi, "because he is an expatriate, he gets \$3,000 a month in hard currency, plus a 25 percent hardship allowance and benefits. He also lives in the compound with free lodging, food, water, and all the other amenities. I get, in Somali shillings, the equivalent of \$250. That's it."

Agency staff often fail to work with local counterparts and practices that would be regarded as intolerably racist elsewhere are routine among charities throughout Africa. Standards of fair employment and treatment that would be illegal in the United States are considered acceptable in humanitarian agencies abroad. What Somali doctor Suleiman Dualeh experienced is not uncommon: "I was the second man in [an aid] program. The boss was a Brit, and one of the expats I considered the most open-minded. We went off to Janaale to set up [a] clinic. We went off together, the boss, his girlfriend who was a doctor, and two Western

nurses. When we arrived, the four-bedroom house was allocated. They took three rooms as bedrooms and made the last room into a warehouse. I was expected to sleep outside, underneath the cars, with the drivers and the guards. . . . When I complained, I was told that they needed the room as a guest room and they were worried that expats who come to visit might not want to share with me. . . ."

Another example: Every morning in Mogadishu and in Baidoa, there is a meeting to discuss security. It is attended by representatives from the relief agencies, the UN, the American forces, and other members of the now multinational force in Somalia. Until mid-January, virtually no Somalis attended—they were made to feel unwelcome. Only security incidents where the victim or the target is a foreigner or a foreign institution are reported; the death and injury of dozens of Somali civilians every week goes unnoticed. Despite the aid agencies' rhetoric about "working with local structures," it was an embarrassed United States embassy, not the agencies, that encouraged Somali voluntary organizations to send representatives.

At the meetings in Baidoa, the only Somali who participates occasionally is a doctor with UNICEF. But foreign relief workers in Baidoa commented that when he attended, there was an unspoken code not to discuss security precautions. An Irish nurse attributed this to a general feeling that as a Somali, the doctor represented a risk. The resentment among local counterparts is not difficult to imagine, though expatriate volunteers rationalize signs of bitterness as ingratitude and a further demonstration that local staff are unreliable.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEARNING FROM THE PAST

A great deal of technical expertise has been accumulated in the last hundred years about how to deal with disasters such as famine. As early as the 1880s in India it was established that the major threat to life in a famine was not starvation but epidemic diseases such as cholera, smallpox, and malaria. It was also established that free food rations should be cut off in advance of the first postfamine harvest, so as not to depress the market in foodgrains. More recently, the dangers of micronutrient deficiencies among refugee populations have been identified, along with a host of other epidemiological, nutritional, technical, and logistical lessons. Yet, a century of accumulated experience consistently counts for naught. Each time, the world seems ill-prepared for the next disaster.

Not only is disaster relief often inappropriate, but it is almost invariably late, and often an uncoordinated shambles. Lack of sufficient consultation with local people is not only offensive—it also leads to the wrong policies. In Somalia recently, those responsible for relief programs have insisted on importing food to regions that were harvesting their postfamine crop. In December 1992, visitors reported that farmers were

mainly concerned not with imminent starvation, but how to sell their surplus maize and sorghum. The crops of many farmers rotted, since they could not compete with the free food that had been imported.

Nonetheless, feeding centers continue to proliferate because they are good for publicity back home. Somali professionals accuse many of the latecomers of exploiting the Somali tragedy for their own fundraising, media profiles, and sense of self-importance. In some districts there are feeding centers practically on top of each other, heightening the competition. Irish Goal, among others, resorts to the distribution of free T-shirts to attract "customers."

Meanwhile, as any experienced physician or epidemiologist could have predicted, the major threat to life now comes from epidemic measles, dysentery, and malaria—the treatment of which lagged well behind free food in the priorities of the relief program. More Somali children are dying from measles than from hunger. Somali health professionals complain bitterly about the proliferation of feeding centers at the expense of health issues. Apart from measles, their priorities are tuberculosis, malaria, and mental health.

All aid agencies make mistakes—that is inevitable. The lack of accountability in UN agencies has belatedly become a cause for international concern, but voluntary agencies can also fail to be accountable either to the victims of disaster or their donors. In some ways, they are less accountable than the UN since they can be selective in their assistance. Their mandates do not specify that they have to assist the suffering of every disaster. Rather, the victims may be privileged to have the presence of the agency—if publicity or internal processes of decision making so decide. Thus, there was no real public pressure on Oxfam or CARE to become operational in Somalia during 1991 and early 1992, when neither had an appreciable number of workers on the ground, whereas there was a clear public perception that UNICEF's absence was a scandal.


TREATING SYMPTOMS BUT NOT THE DISEASE

The starting point for analyzing the voluntary organizations should not be where they would prefer for

us to start, namely with the scandal of world poverty. Instead, it should be with the sociology of charity at home. The rich and powerful have always given assistance to the poor in order to mitigate some of the most extreme manifestations of a political and economic system that they want essentially unchanged. Material help flows to the deserving poor, but power remains firmly with the donors. Those who work for relief agencies, including those in charge of fundraising, rarely intend to degrade their "beneficiaries," and rarely acknowledge that they may be doing so. But any examination of the material used for publicity and fundraising shows this to be the case.

Fundraising is typically centered around pictures, with only minimum story. The picture is usually of a hungry or suffering child (usually black), often with an aid worker (usually white) who is providing food, medicine, or com-

fort. In video portrayals, the white aid worker is the guide and the voice we hear; the aid recipients are reduced to extras, often nameless. This is of course far from the truth: most famine victims are not dependent on foreign aid, and most of the aid is given by local people. The wrenching pictures convey a general sense of helplessness that is an insult to the courage and initiative of local humanitarian workers. Without the work and political judgments of Somalis, the international relief operation would have failed. It is Somali professionals who have done and continue to do most of the work. All the main hospitals in Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country are run primarily, sometimes exclusively, by Somalis. After full-scale war erupted in Mogadishu in November 1991, all the war-wounded were treated by Somali doctors, often in makeshift hospitals. The first foreign hospital was not operational until 10 weeks after the worst fighting had broken out. Somali doctors and nurses—who were not paid, who received one meal a day provided by the Red Cross, who had lost family, friends, and their homes in the war, and who were much more likely to be the targets of gunmen—worked long hours to treat the sick, irrespective of their clan.



DISASTER PORNOGRAPHY?

While a vulture watches, a Sudanese girl falters on her way to a feeding center. The New York Times, Time, and Der Spiegel are among those that have printed this photograph.

KEVIN CARTER

Returning from Somalia, BBC correspondent George Alagiah told *The Independent on Sunday* how these disaster pictures are obtained: "Relief agencies depend upon us for pictures and we need them to tell us where the stories are. There's an unspoken understanding between us, a sort of code. We try not to ask the question too bluntly, 'Where will we find the most starving babies?' And they never answer explicitly. We get the pictures all the same."

As competition for funding increases, the images of human degradation have become increasingly graphic, an exercise in "disaster pornography." Though their views are rarely sought, those who are portrayed in this degrading manner strongly resent it. It is embarrassing, and diminishes their capacity for self-motivation. Somali relief workers talk of the efforts of parents, themselves weak from hunger, who tried to protect their dying children from the noisy intrusion of Western journalists.

To define the problem of famine as a humanitarian crisis that demands a charitable solution is politically naive and drastically narrows the range of options that a voluntary organization will consider. When the stress is on material assistance, without considering the underlying power relations and the human rights context, the result is to prolong human suffering. Voluntary agencies mistake symptoms for diseases; they treat hunger rather than the pathological political-economic systems. In an effort to promote empowerment, many agencies take comfort in a much-quoted line: "Give a man a fish and he has food for a day; teach a man to fish and he has food for life." In the real world, the issue is who has the power to demand bribes for a fishing permit, which ordinary people can ill-afford, and whether the riverbank is mined.

A common justification by PVOs for avoiding political issues has been to stress development, not relief. Since the 1970s, if not before, "long-term development" has been the battle-cry of most relief agencies. Development will show results only over a long period of time, and small-scale development programs can be described as "pioneering" or "pilot projects" that should be "replicable" elsewhere. Relief programs are considered with some distaste; though good for fundraising, disasters are usually seen as a distraction from the more important work of "development."

In Somalia, the roots of the present tragedy lie in the massive corruption and violence of President Siad Barre's rule. In the late 1970s and 1980s, Somalia received more foreign aid per capita than any other country in Africa. These were also the years during which tens of thousands of Somalis were murdered, imprisoned, or tortured because of their real or imaginary opposition to the government, a government that actively pursued the policies that have ravaged Somalia and turned it into a nation of enemies. The PVO leadership argued that speaking out would jeopardize

its development work. But how could Somalia's economy develop when land mines made it difficult to farm, when livestock had been killed, civilians driven from their land, and businesses crippled for political reasons? How could the country move forward when the educated, the experienced, and the young left in large numbers, seeking sanctuary abroad? Balancing the delivery of services to people who need them and challenging governments on human rights grounds pose a difficult moral dilemma to which there is no easy answer. But aid agencies have tended to take the easy way out and to ignore how the underlying political reality affects their work.

The exceptions are few. In Somalia only one voluntary agency spoke out. Community Aid Abroad (CAA), a small Australian agency, closed its primary health care program in late 1989 and withdrew. It issued a blistering condemnation of the government's human rights policies, arguing that economic development was impossible while the government engaged in a war against its own people. CAA's report was crucial in raising international awareness of the disastrous situation in Somalia. If more voluntary agencies had been prepared to take similar action, it is possible that sufficient international revulsion and concern would have been generated to prevent the current disaster.

Relief agencies have absorbed the lesson that they benefit most from disasters. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Oxfam and other progressive relief organizations in Britain faced the dilemma of how to operate as ostensibly nonpolitical charities in a world in which famine was clearly a political issue. They ducked the question by setting up the World Development Movement to campaign on the trickier political issues, and concentrated their own efforts on delivering material assistance. Inevitably, this has pushed them to return to a superficial, nonpolitical analysis of famine.

It is not surprising that a century of international famine relief attempts has proved largely ineffectual. The whole business is being driven by the wrong considerations—at root by the need of the Western political conscience to be able to assuage itself by "saving" far-off, nameless people. In this process the very real technical expertise, managerial experience, and personal integrity of thousands of aid professionals is being used to no great advantage. This applies as much to the private voluntary organizations as to the UN agencies (for the latter, perhaps even more so). As long as famine relief is entrusted to international charities, famine will continue.

In Somalia today, relief agencies are again stressing immediate material need to the exclusion of all else, apparently indifferent to the implications of working under the wing of a foreign occupying force. Agency workers are already speculating on the next port of call for their philanthropic imperialism; will it be southern Sudan, Zaire, Angola?

The unpopular military government of Omar Bashir is engaged in a campaign "designed to methodically transform the very fabric of Sudanese society, molding it into an increasingly militarized and ideological police state in the Iranian style." Meanwhile, an estimated 500,000 Sudanese have died as a result of war and drought, and 1.5 million more may be on the brink of starvation.

Sudan's Human and Political Crisis

BY KHALID MEDANI

A prominent Sudanese scholar once wrote that "there are no religious differences in Africa and...any conflicts that...arise are purely secular in nature"—a controversial declaration, but one that provokes a relatively uncharted course allowing for discovery. Nowhere is such an exploration more needed than in attempts to understand the tragedy that has befallen Sudan.

In Sudan as in Somalia, war rather than any natural catastrophe is the chief culprit behind the humanitarian crisis. Sudanese history over the last four decades has been characterized by systematic human rights abuses, particularly in the south, stemming from an intermittent civil war. Successive governments, including the civilian precursor to the present regime, have brutalized civilians in the south suspected of sympathizing with the guerrillas of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). But under strongman Omar Bashir this policy has been followed with a zeal and ferocity that warrant international condemnation.

Together with drought, desertification, and other ecological calamities, Bashir's military campaigns in the south and fighting between insurgent groups there have resulted in a war-induced famine. Over the last decade these factors have been responsible for the deaths of an estimated 500,000 Sudanese (250,000 in 1988 alone). More than 4 million have been displaced—one-third the entire population of the south. Among these, the United States Agency for International Development estimates that almost 3 million people require emergency food assistance and more than half of these may be on the brink of starvation. In some areas all the children under the age of five have died. Throughout the south, thousands are afflicted by epidemics of a host of diseases. Acute food shortages have aggravated traditional ethnic enmities, which—

combined with the influx of automatic weapons—has led to wholesale massacres.

The humanitarian crisis has been further compounded by spiraling factionalism in the southern insurgency, which in recent years has wrought as much havoc on the civilian population in the south as the war waged by the government (which has encouraged the factionalism). On August 28, 1989, a faction of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army led by Commanders Riek Mashar and Lam Akol (known as the Nasir faction) split from the mainstream rebel movement headed by John Garang's Torit faction—ostensibly over allegations of human rights violations and the latter's reluctance to consider the issue of separation for the south, but also over control of relief supplies. That leaders of the Nasir faction seemed to derive the bulk of their support from the Nuer ethnic group, whereas Garang commands the allegiance of his own Dinka tribe, indicates the injection of an ethnic factor into the dispute.

Within this context of a fractured southern opposition and a south increasingly plagued by internecine strife, Sudanese armed forces launched what proved to be a relatively successful dry-season offensive in March 1992. They were aided by the SPLA's loss of its strategic bases in Ethiopia following the fall of the Mengistu regime in May 1990, but most of all by an inflow to the Bashir regime of Iranian-financed Chinese arms worth an estimated \$300 million. By the end of last year Garang's fortunes, already badly damaged, took a turn for the worse as Khartoum managed to lift the siege of the southern capital of Juba and also to capture the key southern towns of Bor, Kapoeta, and Garang's home base of Torit near the Ugandan border. Contributing to rebel woes, in September the already divided SPLA fractured further, when Garang's deputy and longtime ally, Commander William Nuyon Bany, defected and formed another rebel group.

The offensive achieved for Khartoum the additional objective of obstructing relief supplies to those civilians

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it considered sympathetic to the rebels. The UN's much beleaguered Operation Lifeline Sudan finally came to a halt as the security situation deteriorated. In August government forces summarily executed two Sudanese employees of the Agency for International Development in Juba for "collaborating" with the SPLA. By the end of November the majority of international organizations in the country had evacuated their personnel following the murder of a Norwegian journalist and three relief workers, allegedly by forces loyal to Garang. Recently, after a tentative agreement between the government and representatives of the major insurgencies, UN and other relief agencies have trickled back to the south, but they continue to be hampered by the conflict.

AN INEQUITABLE HISTORY

Western analysts and journalists have more often than not portrayed the war in Sudan as stemming from a cleavage between a monolithic Muslim Arab north increasingly energized by the ideology of Islamic revivalism and a southern Sudanese population distinguished only generally as "black" African, Christian or animist, and of a secular political outlook. This view is actively encouraged by apologists of the Islamic fundamentalist regime in Khartoum, whose interests lie in subverting the diversity of the various communities in Sudan (most notably within the Muslim community itself). In thinly disguised schemes, the apologists manufacture the illusion that the people of the predominantly Muslim north are unequivocally committed to the local fundamentalists' particular version of political Islam.

The reality is that Islamic fundamentalism is a relatively modern phenomenon in Sudan, and the roots of the present conflict are not only more structural in nature but date to the colonial era. Far from being a benign occupation, British rule in Sudan between 1899 and 1956 was formative in establishing the obstacles that were to eventually render north-south reconciliation a truly arduous task. Under the British, development efforts were almost exclusively concentrated in the northern portion of the country—primarily in the fertile lands between the Blue Nile and the White Nile south of Khartoum, but also in central Kordofan to the west and Kassala province in the east.

Colonial authorities advanced what they called their "separate development" policy by promulgating legislation in the south that effectively prevented any economic, political or cultural ties with the north. No doubt conscious that they could not possibly control all Sudan's vast territory and a population comprising as many as 500 ethnic groups, the British pursued a

divide-and-rule policy. Only a year after the conquest of Sudan, Lord Kitchener, the first governor-general, carefully instructed his regional governors in the proper running of Sudanese political affairs: the "task before us all," he told them, "is [to be] thoroughly in touch with the better class of native, through whom we may hope gradually to influence the whole population."

This "better class of native" eventually emerged along traditional sectarian lines and under the banner of the most powerful of the Muslim sects that had dominated the political, social, and economic life of northern Sudan since the fourteenth century. Considerable British patronage, combined with the manner in which Britain negotiated the independence bargain with northern elites, boosted the political fortunes of two parties that were to determine much of the civilian politics of Sudan after independence: the Umma party, affiliated with the Ansar sect, and what is now the Democratic Unionist party, linked to the Khatmiyya sect. This facilitated the consolidation of an Arabic and Islamic identity in the north, as distinct from a south influenced by Christian missionaries who under British sponsorship provided educational and social as well as religious services to the population. These contrasting political identities, in combination with uneven economic development, have driven the Sudanese conflict since it first erupted in 1955, following a short-lived mutiny by a group of southern officers that was put down by the British. Yet in the words of John Garang, it was the latter—"the differential development between northern and southern Sudan"—that played the more important role in triggering the first phase of the civil war, which was to last 17 years.¹

In Khartoum sectarian factionalism helped produce a procession of impotent coalition governments unable or unwilling to act on the nation's problems—a pattern to be repeated with every democratically elected government to come. Eventually the leadership of the Umma party took the unusual step of inviting General Ibrahim Abboud to topple its own government in a military coup. In 1958, a mere two years after independence, Abboud took power, and immediately proceeded to carry out a brutal policy of forced Arabization and Islamization in the south that exaggerated the deep cleavages between the country's two halves. Trumpeting the cause of independence for the south, the Anya Nya guerrilla movement (the military affiliate of the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement) coalesced in the early 1960s to wage war against the regime.

The government voted into power following Abboud's ouster in a 1964 popular uprising was once again dominated by the political parties affiliated with the Khatmiyya and Ansar sects, with the Communist party and the Islamic Charter Front acting as influential spoilers. Predictably no genuine progress was made during this period in relations with the south.

¹John Garang, "Identifying, Selecting, and Implementing Rural Development Strategies in Southern Region, Sudan" (Ph.D. diss., Iowa State University, 1981), pp.42–43.

This changed in May 1969, when Gaafar Nimeiri assumed power in a bloodless military coup. Nimeiri's initial popularity aided a process that led to the March 1972 Addis Ababa accords, which created an autonomous southern regional government within a national unity government; Nimeiri was thus able to promise the south protection of its distinct political and cultural identity. The accords secured a degree of peace between north and south; paradoxically, they also opened a Pandora's box of interethnic disputes in the south as elites there, effectively deprived of full participation in the central government, vied for power, thereby weakening their bargaining position with Khartoum. Without a common enemy in the north, many groups of southerners began to perceive other southern groups as threats. While many saw the Addis Ababa agreement as a miracle of negotiation, it was clear from the outset that despite its many positive elements, the pact was not a permanent solution, but had only laid the groundwork for one.

THE ECONOMIC CATALYST

OPEC's oil price hikes—one year after the Addis Ababa peace accords—played an important role not only in the ultimate resumption of civil conflict in the 1980s but also in the ascent of the Sudanese Islamic fundamentalists. As the Arab oil-producing states accumulated enormous profits, they became extremely interested in overcoming their reliance on the outside world for food, and targeted Sudan as the potential breadbasket of the Arab world.

Far from improving Sudan's economy, however, the flurry of development in the mid- and late 1970s led to deepening woes and exacerbated regional disparities and grievances. Deficient planning, a rising import bill resulting from escalating fuel costs, and pervasive government corruption trapped Sudan in a vicious circle of increasing debt and declining production. Between 1978 and 1982 foreign debt rose from \$3 billion to \$5.2 billion, and was almost double that three years later when Nimeiri was ousted. Even more ominously, regional inequalities were now dangerously exacerbated. Between 1971 and 1980, more than 80 percent of all government expenditure was centered in Khartoum and Blue Nile and Kassala provinces, with little distributed in other northern regions and almost none going to the south.

With the formal economy in shambles, productive activity came to be concentrated almost exclusively in the "hidden economy," fed by remittances from the hundreds of thousands of Sudanese who, beginning in the mid-1970s, had for economic reasons migrated to the Arab Gulf countries. In 1985 formal remittances represented more than 70 percent of the value of Sudan's exports and 35 percent of all imports. Most of these assets, estimated at close to \$3 billion, were channeled through black market transactions that

quickly came to be monopolized by the Islamic fundamentalists.

Another development in the late 1970s that significantly promoted the fundamentalists' political clout was Nimeiri's encouragement of Islamic banks in hopes of attracting ever more capital from the Gulf while simultaneously cultivating the allegiance of the Muslim Brothers. The financial power of the Brothers gave them economic leverage that they first used in cultivating a well-organized, albeit numerically small, constituency among the urban middle class, students, and elements of the military establishment. Later, they pressed for the full application of Islamic law (Sharia).

The active support of the Muslim Brothers helped turn Nimeiri into a ruthless dictator who would pitch the country back into civil war. By the early 1980s he had become desperate, with the economy crippled by an \$8-billion debt and his political base ever narrower. In June 1983, under the pretext of granting more power to the marginalized groups in the south but primarily to secure revenues after the discovery of oil in the southern town of Bentiu, Nimeiri unilaterally decreed the south's division into three regions—effectively abrogating the Addis Ababa agreement and the peace between north and south it had brought. In September Nimeiri imposed the Sharia, with a view to undermining sectarian parties and appeasing fundamentalists. The September Laws, as they came to be known, introduced archaic and inhuman criminal penalties that included flogging and the amputation of limbs for offenses such as petty theft and the consumption of alcohol. More ominously, they made religion one of the leading divisive factors in the Sudanese conflict.

Garang's formation of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement in July 1983, a full three months before Nimeiri's implementation of Sharia, was in response to a central government not only increasingly set against the south, but one that had become extremely unpopular in the north as well. Garang rejected secessionism, calling instead for a "national revolution" that would restructure the country's economy to correct its regional and social inequities and fashion a new, united Sudan that transcended all barriers of religion, race, culture, and even gender.

It was less clear, however, whether many of his movement's rank and file shared Garang's vision of a united Sudan, or whether they fought for the more limited objective of liberating their homelands from a government they considered alien. Garang's success on the battlefield throughout the 1980s, however, meant that he was able to effectively silence those southern voices calling for separation. His was an ambitious goal, but one whose realization seemed possible following Nimeiri's ouster by an *intifada* (popular uprising) on April 5, 1985, triggered by a government attempt to implement an International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity program.

A FLEETING VICTORY FOR THE DEMOCRATS

While the history of Sudan after independence has been dominated by two military regimes, both were brought down not by military might but by a coalition of "Modern Forces" (*al-quwah al-haditha*) consisting of federations of professionals, civil servants, tenant unions, and artisans sharing a markedly secular political orientation. Without precedent in Africa, these forces took to the streets in mainly peaceful protests, and were largely responsible for the fall of the two military governments. On each occasion the call for a lasting resolution of the civil war was at the top of the agenda; after Nimeiri's departure in 1985 the Modern Forces diligently pressed the democratically elected government to realize this objective.

Reminiscent of previous bouts of parliamentary government, Sudan's most recent experiment with democracy saw as many as five different coalition governments in three years before the last was overthrown by a military coup in 1989. Yet in the midst of these crises, significant efforts were made toward negotiating a viable settlement to the southern conflict. This time peace seemed imminent precisely because a cross-section of Sudanese, comprising intellectuals and members of the professional and trade unions, took to the streets in December 1988. In a strongly worded memorandum supported by a broad segment of the military, these opponents of the regime effectively presented Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi with an ultimatum: resolve the civil war and repeal the September Laws. A reluctant Mahdi was forced to move toward implementing a 1988 agreement between Garang and the Democratic Unionist party leader, Sayed Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, involving an immediate cease-fire, a freeze on the September Laws until a constitutional conference could be convened to deliberate on them, and abrogation of defense pacts with countries the SPLA viewed as hostile to its interests. For its part, the Islamic Front found these terms so threatening to its Islamist political agenda that it withdrew from the governing coalition. The front's leadership was particularly distressed by Mahdi's decision to incorporate into the new government members of the professional and trade unions whose secular outlook and democratic inclinations were well known.

On June 30, 1989, only 24 hours before representatives of the SPLA and the major political parties were to meet to review the final draft of the peace agreement, a coup led by Omar Bashir ousted the Mahdi government, aborting the fragile—but nonetheless promising—democratic experiment. The timing of the coup and the regime's actions that followed made it abun-

dantly clear that Bashir and the other members of the Revolutionary Command Council were linked to the Islamists.

Following the council's dissolution of all political parties, trade unions, and civil associations and the repeal of all freedoms of speech and assembly, extrajudicial detentions, torture, and summary executions were carried out across the country. The group with the greatest number of victims among its members was the Modern Forces. Any doubts as to the close link between the regime and the Islamic Front were quickly dispelled as the instigators of the June coup forcibly retired hundreds of military officers and replaced hundreds of civil servants with front members. This ongoing campaign is designed to transform the very fabric of Sudanese society, molding it into an increasingly militarized and ideological police state in the Iranian style. It soon became evident, however, that the Islamic Front's unpopularity in Sudan, and the bankrupt economy, would make this task difficult, particularly as the front become increasingly isolated internationally.

IRAN: SPREADING FUNDAMENTALISM?

Khartoum's abysmal human rights record and its fateful decision to support Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Persian Gulf war cemented its regional and international isolation, and left the regime little choice but to turn to the Islamic Republic of Iran for political and economic salvation. The alliance between Iran and Sudan, closely nurtured in the period following President Ali Hashimi Rafsanjani's visit to Khartoum in December 1992, sent shudders through the Arab world and beyond, sparking concern that Iran might attempt to use Sudan as a springboard to promote political Islam in Egypt and across North Africa.²

In reality the Khartoum-Teheran venture was induced by pragmatism rather than ideological affinity. Denied financial assistance from their old benefactors in the Gulf and repeatedly spurned by the IMF on requests for fresh loans, the Sudanese fundamentalists hoped to gain commercial and military support by consolidating relations with Iran. Teheran, on the other hand, wanted to use Sudan not so much to encourage Islamic governments in sub-Saharan Africa but to pursue its well-known regional ambitions and politically outmaneuver its key adversaries in the region, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

So far, however, Iran's chief contribution has been to assist in establishing a ubiquitous security apparatus in Sudan, made up of the Popular Defense Forces, the security police, and the clandestine Security of the Front (which is linked to the National Islamic Front), whose operations have led to the worsening humanitarian crisis in the country. Iranian military assistance and technical training have enabled the government to purchase the Chinese weaponry that it has used to

²Indeed, by March 1993 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, troubled by the increasing Islamist threat within his own borders, warned Sudan that Egypt would attack any Iranian naval ships allowed access to Sudan's Red Sea coast.

devastating effect against the south, as well as in violent suppressions of rebellions in northern urban areas sparked by an inflation rate of 120 percent and in the "pacification" of the western province of Darfur. In the central portion of the country, it has enabled Khartoum to carry out against the Muslims of the Nuba Mountains what Amnesty International has termed an "ethnic cleansing," involving widespread arrests, killings, and the forced relocation of hundreds of thousands from their fertile—and much coveted—ancestral lands.

The spreading of Islamic fundamentalism has been hampered by the relatively limited financial transfers from Iran (approximating \$86 million). Recent overtures by the Bashir regime to Teheran for more credit transfers have not gained more than an agreement to expand air and sea transportation routes between the two nations. Nevertheless, millions of dollars derived from Iran and from fundamentalist supporters elsewhere have been diverted to fundamentalist groups in Egypt and North Africa through the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC), headed by National Islamic Front leader Hassan Turabi. An umbrella group for several Islamic fundamentalist organizations, the PAIC is ostensibly concerned with no more than "sending forth [the Islamic] idea."

DEMOCRACY AS CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Any efforts at finding a lasting resolution to the Sudanese crisis should take full account of the country's history, looking beyond reductive notions of the north-south dichotomy. Khartoum's links with the wider world of political Islam, and the factionalism in the southern rebel groups, require a more ambitious agenda.

Alleviating the humanitarian crisis in the south must be the first priority. In this respect it is difficult to see a peace agreement resolving the civil conflict, particularly when one considers the factors contributing to the ascendancy of the Sudanese fundamentalists and their calculated abortion of the democratic experiment. A series of negotiations between the Bashir regime and the SPLA culminating in the Sudanese Peace Conference convened in Abuja, Nigeria, last May yielded little progress beyond a nebulous agreement on a federal structure for the nation. Moreover, Iranian military support of Khartoum and divisions in the SPLA make an agreement unlikely.

The international community must contemplate restoring some semblance of well-being to the affected populations in Sudan. The appointment of a special human rights observer and the establishment of "safe havens" to allow for the secure delivery of relief supplies, while urgently needed, must be augmented

with a larger observer mission under UN auspices consisting of hundreds of local human rights observers not only in the south, but in the north, in Darfur province, and in the Nuba Mountains region. Their security should be guaranteed pending an agreement with the Sudanese government and the SPLA factions as well as the exiled democratic opposition.

Such an experiment, like the one now under way in Haiti, has a number of advantages. It establishes a permanent monitoring presence and promotes local participation and strengthens independent civil institutions, providing a viable alternative to the slew of government and rebel organizations that habitually have redirected or obstructed relief supplies to further their own political ends. In combination with intense diplomatic pressure and regional coordination, it could also set the stage for national reconciliation and the restoration of democracy.

Several developments indicate that there is some room—albeit still limited—to maneuver. Khartoum's isolation, particularly in the international financial arena, should be an important factor in policy considerations. In April 1992 the government instituted reforms that went beyond the IMF's policy recommendations, ending subsidies on goods from bread to gasoline and embarking on an ambitious privatization program. This scheme, whose chief contribution has been to impoverish large segments of the nation while benefiting Islamic Front supporters, is clearly designed to garner desperately needed funds from multilateral and bilateral donors.

A close review of Sudanese history shows no peaceful resolution to the conflict can be managed without including the country's resilient, secular, Modern Forces. Almost immediately after the Bashir coup, the Modern Forces, in conjunction with the old political parties and the SPLA, organized under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance. This group, while still fractured, should be given a hearing by the United States and the international community, and its work toward reestablishing democracy vigorously encouraged. Moreover, the Democratic Alliance's present lack of coherent policy on the central issues of peace, power sharing, and Islamic law could potentially be resolved with international prodding.

Insistence on democracy as the ultimate tool of conflict resolution should not be viewed as an attempt to subvert Sudan's sovereignty, but rather as a demonstration of confidence in the genuine democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people, unencumbered by dreams of conquest or rallying gestures at fortress walls. ■

"That the bewildering array of ethnic formations in Ethiopia have been permitted a degree of freedom not witnessed since well before the Mengistu era is an encouraging sign. And most have freely chosen the side of those working for the reconstruction of Ethiopia rather than its dismemberment."

The Future of the Ethiopian State after Mengistu

BY JOHN W. HARBESON

Exactly two years after the fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam's Stalinist dictatorship, the future of the Ethiopian state remains very much in question. Although the seeds of the present crisis were sown in the post-World War II era during Haile Selassie's reign, modern Ethiopian history offers hopeful precedents for the country's revival after periods of great fragmentation and disarray. But the challenges confronting the new Meles Zenawi regime seem far greater in relation to the resources available to meet them. The crucial—and untested—assumption underlying the government's initiatives, initiatives international observers have demanded, is that institutionalizing political pluralism and economic liberalism will legitimize an Ethiopian state in some form, as well as Zenawi's own regime, and allow economic policies to generate the country's renaissance.

THE REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T

What were the seeds of the present crisis that were sown by Haile Selassie? First, there is little evidence to suggest that the province of Eritrea was not prepared to accept a 1951 United Nations-brokered federation with Ethiopia; after all, formal federation would have been consistent with the large measure of decentralization that characterized the reigns of earlier emperors. But Haile Selassie systematically manipulated and maneuvered the Eritrean parliament into approving full incorporation into Ethiopia. This prompted the emergence of Eritrean liberation movements that have since been generally unwilling to consider a return to the status quo ante.

Second, Haile Selassie's approach toward socioeconomic and political modernization strengthened his rule but undermined the legitimacy of his modernization policies and, more fundamentally, the legitimacy

of the state itself. While his fostering of education and economic development helped him escape from the clutches of the country's traditional, quasi-feudal landlords, the emperor's brand of modernization also simply empowered a new group of elites without significantly altering the regime's feudal and oligarchic character, and so did little to improve the circumstances of most Ethiopians; modernizing elites were successfully co-opted into the service of what remained a deeply tradition-bound regime. In the eyes of ordinary Ethiopians, Haile Selassie thereby undermined not only the credibility of these elites as agents of modernization but the modernization process itself—and their suspicions were borne out by the regime's paralysis when the famine of the early 1970s hit. The Ethiopian state atrophied along with the aging emperor.

The great irony of the Mengistu regime—and the underlying cause of its demise—was that the more revolutionary its quest for change, the more it replicated the weaknesses that brought an end to Haile Selassie's government. Its ultimate legacy was not the change it professed to seek, which proved ephemeral, but a further weakening of the Ethiopian state. In the process, the real losers were the people of Ethiopia, who badly needed revolutionary improvement in their standard of living. While Mengistu must be given credit for dramatically increasing literacy, Ethiopia has remained among the world's two or three poorest countries. Virtually all the structures the regime put in place to supplant the quasi-feudal order of Haile Selassie and his predecessors and lift Ethiopians out of abject poverty have crumbled and have been discarded.

Why and how did Mengistu's revolution run aground? The basic answer is that the regime failed to achieve legitimacy. Mengistu and his lieutenants disagreed with the objectives and fatally misjudged the strength of a revolution already in progress. The unprecedented resignation of an imperial cabinet in February 1974 unleashed waves of mass strikes and demonstrations that reached into virtually every segment of the population, including the rank and file of

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the military; no new ministers capable of quieting the unrest could be found. The popular calls for change included wage increases and other benefits but, more fundamentally, envisioned a new order that would make achieving these goals possible—one that enshrined freedom of expression and association, popularly elected government, ethnic autonomy, land reform, and safeguards against official corruption.

The problem was that this widespread uprising was essentially leaderless, since virtually all the elites had been co-opted by the imperial regime. An initially anonymous 120-member committee of junior military officers, including Mengistu, was formed in an attempt to provide leadership and to stem the potential for chaos and renewed ethnic Somali irredentism centered in the Ogaden region bordering Somalia.

While the military committee concentrated on ousting the government it enjoyed popular support. But no sooner had it dethroned and imprisoned the emperor in September 1974 than it found itself at cross-purposes with the popular insurgency. Simply put, the issue was whether to proceed to civilian, elected government immediately, as the insurgents insisted, or to postpone civilian rule until the military committee dismantled the structures on which the old regime rested and created new ones, particularly through land reform. Mengistu claimed that returning immediately to civilian government would only re-empower the elites co-opted by Haile Selassie.

Underlying this issue of revolutionary process were deeper differences over both revolutionary ends and means. Initially, students and a substantial number of intellectuals shared the Marxist predilections of Mengistu and at least some of his lieutenants. But they had no stomach for Stalinist dictatorship masquerading as the dictatorship of the proletariat, preferring something more akin to democratic socialism. Meanwhile the foot soldiers of the popular insurgency seemed to want only freedom of expression and association, land reform, and a share of the ill-gotten official wealth.

The Mengistu regime did not retreat from its position until it was on the point of collapse in 1990–1991, at which time it abandoned nearly everything it had attempted. But during its tenure, it sought ceaselessly to bend the popular will to its revolutionary vision. The more it undertook to implement its vision—at first with the somewhat skeptical support of the Soviet Union—the more it was reduced to ruling by coercion rather than consent. Shortly after it had dethroned Haile Selassie, the regime dramatically broke with the past in November 1974, when it summarily and without warning executed 60 senior officials of the old regime. In executing along with them the interim leader of the military government, Eritrean-born General Aman Andom, Mengistu torpedoed a last and potentially fruitful dialogue with the Eritrean liberation movements that might have led to rapprochement.

A few months later the Mengistu government appeared to gain a measure of legitimacy with the promulgation of sweeping rural and urban land reforms, the nationalization of major businesses and industries, and the launching of a high school and college student campaign to implement these reforms and teach reading and preventive medicine in Ethiopia's villages and neighborhoods. Mengistu gambled that a frontal attack on the bases of the old order combined with the launching of these popular reforms would gain for his supposedly transitional regime sufficient legitimacy for him to help bring a new state to birth.

In retrospect, it appears the gamble was lost almost as soon as it was made. Already on the defensive for failing to restore civilian rule immediately, the regime lacked the legitimacy necessary to impose order so that the reforms could be implemented. In rural areas it tended to fall back temporarily on remnants of the old order, and in so doing angered the constituencies whose insurgencies had fatally undermined that order.

In urban areas the regime quickly found itself embroiled in a civil war between civilians opposed to continued military rule and those who shared its ideas, and it ended up alienating both. The initial urban and rural land reforms of 1975 provided for a large measure of local autonomy in their implementation. This opportunity precipitated a civil war between civilian partisans of the regime, which coalesced into the faction known as MEISON (Marxist All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement), and opponents increasingly allied under the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary party (EPRP). Unable to suppress the violence, the regime tried to terminate the experiment in neighborhood self-government, driving MEISON into opposition along with the EPRP.

THE DICTATORSHIP'S WINDOW DRESSING

After rejecting power sharing with civilian groups, the terror of the late 1970s demonstrated that the Mengistu regime had trapped itself into defending its existence by military means alone. What began as a 120-member military committee evolved into a military dictatorship, with all those favoring dialogue with Eritrea and a sharing of power with civilians forced out—and in many instances, killed—including those belonging to its erstwhile civil partner, MEISON. The later reforms, such as the radicalization of the land reforms, a resettlement project, and all the efforts to give central direction to the economy, featured transparent efforts to strengthen military rule under the umbrella of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. The Mengistu regime pointed to the formation of the Workers party of Ethiopia in the mid-1980s as the fulfillment of its promise to return the country to civilian and popularly based rule. But in both design and implementation the new party confirmed that transitional military rule had

become permanent; the appearance of civilian participation was mere window dressing.

The pathology of the Mengistu regime bore a certain resemblance to that of Emperor Tewodros more than a century earlier, whose effort to reconstruct the state by military means ultimately proved self-destructive. Like Haile Selassie with Eritrea, both Mengistu and Tewodros proved unequal to the task of altering the historic balance between the notion of unchallenged imperial supremacy and tacit acceptance of significant decentralization. Both Mengistu and Tewodros treated socioeconomic reforms as theaters of war, viewing inability or unwillingness to respond to government initiatives as evidence of an enemy presence. Under both rulers resistance to the regime grew in direct proportion to its military exertions and to the destitution it wrought among the people. At the end of the day, the Mengistu regime diverted well over 50 percent of the national budget to a military effort that backfired. It devoted much of the nondefense budget to instruments for state control of the economy that increasingly emphasized acceptance of the regime's authority and economic support for its war efforts.

The more the Mengistu government intensified its war-making, the more it set itself up as synonymous with the Ethiopian state; in so doing it made the Ethiopian state as well as itself the target of growing opposition. The regime did cash in the political and socioeconomic structures of the imperial past, but it failed to win acceptance for any new basis for political order—leaving a political vacuum of far broader and deeper proportions than the one that allowed its rise to power in 1974.

OPPOSED TO MENGISTU

Evidence that the regime's collapse placed the Ethiopian state at risk is to be found in the nature of the opposition movements that brought Mengistu down. At the grassroots, literally dozens of overlapping movements based on ethnic identity reflected historical realities largely unaltered by Mengistu's socioeconomic agenda. The major opposition groups developed along the fault lines of the fragile pan-ethnic Ethiopian state the modern emperors had labored to construct. As such, they reflected not so much controversy over the shape of a postimperial Ethiopian state but the question of whether the state, as defined by imperial conquest, would continue. United in their determination to overthrow the Mengistu regime but with the nature and strength of their ties to each other difficult to assess at this point, these opposition groups have not yet reached an understanding on the state.

The principal movements that collaborated to topple Mengistu and his cohorts were the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), which allied with non-Tigrean groups to form

the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), now the ruling group in the country. But what did each of these three major movements represent in the lead-up to Mengistu's overthrow, and what might they stand for in the future?

The EPLF. Secure access to the Red Sea through what is now Eritrea helped distinguish strong emperors from their opposite numbers. In the late nineteenth century, Italian colonization set Eritrea on a track very different from that of the rest of Ethiopia. Like other African colonies, the Italians exposed the region to many of the same opportunities and indignities that came with colonial rule. Benefiting from its long coastline, Eritrea saw commercial and industrial development, urbanization, and a Western education that set it apart from Ethiopia. Not only was such modernization more rapid and extensive than in its southern neighbor but, shielded by Italian rule, the participants were somewhat less subject to co-optation by the imperial regime. At the same time, however, Eritrea did not offer enough opportunities for the upwardly mobile, and a great many Eritreans lived and worked in Ethiopia—indeed, provided vital support for that country's only development efforts. Eritreans identified with Ethiopian efforts to rid themselves of Italian rule during the 1936–1941 occupation, and filled critical positions in Haile Selassie's administration and in Ethiopia's fledgling education, agricultural, and industrial sectors.

Haile Selassie's rejection of federation not only shattered a hard-won basis of political association but tore at the modern interdependence that built on and overlay the historic cultural and economic intercourse between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The engineered union with Ethiopia precipitated the formation of the Eritrean Liberation Front, soon to be overtaken by the more militant EPLF. Haile Selassie's and Mengistu's unwavering efforts to destroy the latter with military force perpetuated a 30-year war that culminated in *de facto* independence for Eritrea in 1991 and contributed greatly to the collapse of the Mengistu regime. The referendum on Eritrea's political future scheduled for this April will almost surely produce a verdict for independence. But the need to resume economic cooperation with Ethiopia has remained unchanged by the decades of war. That, combined with many uncertainties regarding Ethiopia, contributes to a clouded political future for the entire Horn of Africa.

The OLF. The movement for Oromo liberation is of more recent origin; it is also more divided and has a more ambivalent purpose than Eritrea's drive for independence. Emblematic of the further weakening of the Ethiopian state during Mengistu's reign, the movement seeks to embrace the two-thirds or more of the people and territory of southern Ethiopia incorporated into the country by the conquests of Haile Selassie's

turn-of-the-century predecessor, Menelik II. The peoples brought into the empire were diverse, many of them having previously been overrun by the Oromo or Galla, as they were once known. Whatever cultural glue the Oromo movement has holding it together derives in part from these earlier conquests, as well as from the common forced submission to Menelik. Menelik's peace terms involved appropriation of land for imperial purposes, settlement of his soldiers and predominantly Amhara civil servants (known as *neftenya*), and the return of some lands to the conquered in exchange for their surrender. Thus developed a pattern of exploitative tenancy and landlordism—often with absentee owners—amounting to a degree of class stratification generally unmatched in the north.

But as in Eritrea, the lines between conqueror and conquered became blurred during Haile Selassie's reign. Partly in response to official pressure, partly due to Haile Selassie's practice of elite co-optation, and partly out of self-interest, many people in the south acquired fluency in the Amharic language and converted to the Coptic Christianity of their conquerors. Intermixing of these peoples did not begin with Menelik, nor did it end with his conquests. Notwithstanding important differences in their cultural traditions, shared acceptance of Ethiopian political identity grew, at least among elites.

The emergence of the OLF and competing movements is in one sense ironic, since Mengistu's initial land reform was primarily targeted at the tenant population of the south. Reform probably did more to deliver people in the south from the yoke of imperial-era feudalism than it did in the north, where the impact on traditional land tenure relationships was more complicated. But the inability of the Mengistu government to dislodge the remnants of Haile Selassie's regime at local levels promptly, its heavy-handed attempts to control economic life, and the perception that it was an Amhara imperial government in another guise sparked the growth of Oromo liberation movements.

The OLF's military forces were too small, weak, and loosely organized to pose any real threat to Mengistu's military, and they are still distinctly weaker than those of the other two main opposition groups. Moreover, the movement has been distracted by competition with Somali-based liberation movements over the control of districts with mixed Somali and non-Somali ethnic populations. The OLF has faced more serious contention for the loyalty of Oromo peoples than has the EPLF among the Eritrean people. More fundamentally, however, the ultimate objective of the OLF and its rivals has remained more ambivalent than those of the Eritreans, alternating among increased influence at the center, greater decentralization, regional autonomy, and independence. While the EPLF has for years been committed almost unreservedly to independence, the

center of gravity in the Oromo Liberation Front appears to lie somewhere between increased power at the center and local autonomy.

The EPRDF. This movement, which now governs Ethiopia, has been a coalition of the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front and the insurgent groups it established close ties with in the course of its war to overthrow Mengistu. The TPLF in turn received important encouragement and assistance from the EPLF, notwithstanding that the TPLF sought to rule Ethiopia and the latter was bent on secession.

The origins of the Tigrean Front seem to lie in a dynastic tug-of-war within the ancient empire over where the seat of power was to be. Ethiopian emperors historically moved about continually, somewhat defusing the issue, but after Johannes's reign (1869–1886) the center of power shifted to south to the Shoa region where Menelik was king, and it has remained there ever since. The Tigrean rulers in their northern kingdom continued to represent potential dynastic challengers to Haile Selassie. Tigre's reluctant acceptance of the emperor's authority came to a head in 1943 with a major rebellion shortly after Haile Selassie's return from wartime exile. The uprising required considerable military force to put down, and many Tigreans—like the Oromo peoples—continued to chafe under Amhara rule. The devastating effect of ragtag peasant armies marched across Tigre by the Mengistu regime on their way to disastrous engagements in Eritrea helped precipitate the emergence of the TPLF.

Despite Tigre's history, the Tigrean Front chose to focus on changing the regime in Addis Ababa rather than pushing for independence, and its strategy against Mengistu was to spawn groups in non-Tigre areas that would be allies to this cause. Since coming to power in 1991 under the banner of the EPRDF, it has continued to do so in Oromo areas, notably with the formation of Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO). The strategy has enabled it to gain and so far hold power, but long-term viability remains a question. Many Amhara correctly perceive the governing coalition as Tigrean-dominated, and do not welcome it, and the emergence of the OPDO and other smaller groups is a major issue between the ruling movement and the Oromo Liberation Front, with which it collaborated in the war to overthrow Mengistu and for a brief time afterward.

GETTING EVERYONE MOVING IN THE SAME DIRECTION

The EPRDF under the leadership of Meles Zenawi confronts the twin tasks of consolidating its own government and preventing Eritrean separation from having a domino effect, leading to the further disintegration of the Ethiopian state. It also faces the daunting work of ensuring the delivery of humanitarian relief for

famine and war victims, stimulating economic development, dealing with the needs of refugees returning from neighboring countries, and coping with the effects of civil war in Sudan and an apparently failed Somali state.

The government addresses these challenges in the new and largely uncharted conditions that prevail with the cold war's end. Private trade in armaments continues but superpower interest in providing countervailing security for the regime does not. United States mediation may have been critical in ensuring a relatively peaceful transition from Mengistu to Meles Zenawi, but the dominant motive there may have been the airlifting of Ethiopian Jews to Israel, a relatively narrow concern from Ethiopia's perspective.

If there is a broader interest in Ethiopia's future by the United States and other major powers, it lies in an ideological commitment to political pluralism and a market economy—the unspoken premise being that democracy and economic liberalism are the key to regime consolidation and state reconstruction. But the record to date of the EPRDF government, ostensibly committed to both political pluralism and private enterprise, generates doubt about that assumption.

The Meles regime encouraged domestic and international observers by promptly calling an all-party conference in July 1991 for the purpose of working out a plan for a transition to an elected government. The 20 parties attending (including the constituent parties of the governing coalition) agreed on the structure and composition of an interim Council of Representatives pending national elections, and accepted a referendum on Eritrea in return for guaranteed access through Eritrea to Red Sea ports. The Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front agreed to postpone the referendum for two years in order not to further destabilize Ethiopia—a move much in its own as well as Ethiopia's interests. This exercise, while now common elsewhere, is without precedent in Ethiopia's long history. The agreements reached at the conference went a good distance toward meeting pledges whose scuttling by Mengistu helped ensure his regime's demise.

But standing outside the agreement were the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary party and MEISON, which question the regime's commitment to democracy and appear to be energized by Amhara unhappiness with their subordinate place in the new regime and with Eritrean independence. Also standing outside the

agreement was the Mo'a Ambesa movement, which wants to restore the monarchy, believing it the only alternative to the disintegration of the state. Last year the ranks of the dissenters grew when the Oromo Liberation Front severed its links with the governing coalition, giving as proximate cause irregularities in the conduct of neighborhood and district-level elections preparatory to regional and national balloting. The OLF and the EPRDF have accused each other of violating an agreement to encamp their armies. More fundamentally, the OLF has reacted to the regime's attempts to nurture competing allied parties among the Oromo, as it did among the Amhara; as the OLF sees it, the ruling movement has put regime consolidation ahead of the goal of state reconstruction symbolized by the July 1991 conference. Despite repeated government efforts to defuse the situation, the Oromo Front stands on the threshold of a decision to resort to civil war.

Relations between the EPRDF and the EPLF have been complicated by the return of Sultan Ali Mira, who was forced into exile early in the Mengistu era, and the sultan's desire for a unified region for his seminomadic, pastoralist Afar people. The Afar sphere stands athwart the principal road connecting Addis Ababa with the coast, and incorporates parts of both Eritrea and Ethiopia. It also extends into Djibouti, where tensions between the Isa and the Afar are again near the breaking point. The sultan has shown an inclination to seek unification within Ethiopia. Afar interests can only be accommodated to the extent that the EPRDF and EPLF make good on their commitments to post-independence economic cooperation and the free movement of people. While still generally satisfactory, relations between the two fronts have been tested by the forced repatriation of non-Eritreans to Ethiopia and by the presence of factions within Ethiopia still unwilling to accept Eritrean separation.

That the bewildering array of ethnic formations in Ethiopia have been permitted a degree of freedom not witnessed since well before the Mengistu era is an encouraging sign. And most have freely chosen the side of those working for the reconstruction of Ethiopia rather than its dismemberment. While their positions are still tentative, the possibility remains that a new Ethiopian state will emerge that will successfully accommodate ethnic and political diversity. ■

While international attention has been focused on Somalia, nearly 4,000 miles to the west another African country faces almost similar conditions of state collapse, ethnic fighting, and the flight of hundreds of thousands of citizens. Yet Liberia, which, like Somalia, was a cold war "ally" of the United States, continues to disintegrate as the rest of the world stands by.

Liberia: An Avoidable Tragedy

BY WILLIAM O'NEILL

Liberia has descended into a state of anarchy and violence that rivals Somalia or Bosnia and Herzegovina. A vicious civil war has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of innocent civilians, and about half the country's 2.3 million people have fled their homes and are either refugees in neighboring states or are displaced inside Liberia. The economy has been destroyed, famine remains a threat, and health conditions are catastrophic.

Liberia's tragic journey from a poor, struggling country with substantial economic potential to its current status as a "failed state" yields important lessons about the central role human rights and the rule of law play in preventing civil war and promoting economic growth. It is also an indictment of a cold war United States foreign policy that catalyzed this journey.

THE UGLY AMERICO-LIBERIAN

It has been said that Liberia is the closest thing to an African colony that the United States ever had. The American Colonization Society purchased land on the west coast of Africa and sent freed slaves to settle there in 1827. Twenty years later Liberia became the first independent republic in Africa and the second black republic in the world after Haiti. Its capital was named Monrovia after the fifth United States president, James Monroe. Scholars at Harvard Law School wrote the country's constitution while professors at Cornell University drafted the nation's general laws.

The freed slaves from the United States and their descendants, known as Americo-Liberians, quickly became predominant, with the indigenous people relegated to a largely pastoral existence. Americo-Liberians controlled the economy and the government from the coastal cities. There was enormous disparity

in the distribution of wealth; the Americo-Liberians heavily taxed the indigenous inhabitants and imposed forced labor for public work projects. The elite classified the indigenous as "aborigines" and effectively disenfranchised them by making property ownership a prerequisite for voting.

The first indication that Americo-Liberian dominance was seriously endangered occurred in April 1979, when President William Tolbert announced an increase in the price of rice, a staple in the Liberian diet. The announcement came just after Tolbert had spent over \$100 million to host an Organization of African Unity conference. Citizens soon filled the streets of downtown Monrovia to protest the price increase and Tolbert ordered his troops to fire on the unarmed demonstrators, killing at least 40 of them.

Indigenous soldiers resented being ordered to fire on fellow Liberians by their Americo-Liberian officers. It was a resentment that reached a climax one year later when, on April 12, 1980, a nearly illiterate soldier from an obscure village in eastern Liberia launched the coup that ended Americo-Liberian rule—and began Liberia's disintegration.

DOE'S REIGN OF TERROR

The young soldier, Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, had emerged as the leader of the indigenous soldiers and had called for Tolbert's removal because of rampant corruption, excessive concentration of power, and violations of human rights. Many Liberians welcomed the coup (during which Doe reportedly hid in the bushes while soldiers stormed the Executive Mansion and murdered and disemboweled President Tolbert) and Doe's promises to end corruption, distribute wealth more equitably, and ensure full participation in the political process. Yet the public execution of 13 senior officials in Tolbert's government by drunken soldiers on a beach in Monrovia on April 20, which was televised around the world, seared itself into the minds of most Liberians and caused many to doubt Doe's promises of freedom and justice.

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Doe's subsequent actions proved those doubts were well founded. The new leader and his cronies formed a People's Redemption Council, which suspended the constitution, declared martial law, banned political activity, and dissolved the executive and the legislature. The PRC consolidated all power and ruled by decree. The council also usurped the judiciary, creating a Supreme Judiciary Council composed of five army officers to hear cases of treason.

During the early 1980s Doe's repression was focused on suspected rivals, student groups, and the press. As many as 50 members of the armed forces believed to be plotting a coup were tried in secret by the Supreme Judiciary Council and executed. Five members of the PRC, including co-chairman Thomas Weh-Sehn, were also accused of plotting a coup and were executed in August 1991. Arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention without trial were common for anyone suspected of opposing Doe or violating the ban on political activity. Soldiers routinely beat detainees; some were kept for weeks in solitary confinement without being questioned or charged with a crime.

Students, especially those at the University of Liberia, were Doe's second principal target in the early 1980s. In 1982 the PRC banned all academic activities that "directly or indirectly impinge, interfere with or cast aspersion upon the activities, programs or policies of the People's Redemption Council." On August 22, 1984, 200 soldiers attacked students on the university campus protesting the arrest of popular professor Amos Sawyer on suspicion of treason; an unknown number of students were killed. The soldiers arrested, detained, and beat hundreds more, and reportedly raped female students. The Doe government denied any killings took place and acknowledged only one case of sexual abuse. The message was clear: the army is above the law.

Doe also did not hesitate to crack down on the press. In the first two years after the coup, the Liberian press had enjoyed relative freedom. By 1982, however, the government began to shut down independent newspapers by decree. Journalists were arrested and sometimes beaten. *The Daily Observer*, the country's largest independent newspaper at the time, was shut down four times between 1981 and 1984. Its editor, Kenneth Best, was detained twice by the military, and Willis Knuckles, a reporter for *The Daily Observer*, was arrested and severely beaten in February 1984 for telling the BBC that Liberians had criticized the government's closing of the paper.

Meanwhile, United States interest in the country was renewed. Alarmed at reports that Libya was influencing Doe, the administration of President Ron-

ald Reagan began to pour aid money into Liberia in unprecedented amounts; Doe quickly realized the rules of the game and responded by closing the Libyan embassy, thereby ensuring even more aid. From 1980 to 1985, the United States gave Liberia nearly \$500 million (including approximately \$65 million in military aid), making Liberia the largest per capita aid recipient in sub-Saharan Africa. The aid monies amounted to one-third of Liberia's annual budget. Corruption grew rampant even by Liberian standards, with much of the aid disappearing into the personal accounts of Doe and others in the PRC.

The Reagan administration ignored the corruption and Doe's abysmal human rights record in part because Liberia hosted several key facilities in the fight to contain Soviet influence in Africa; these included a Voice of America transmitter that relayed broadcasts to all of sub-Saharan Africa and a communications station that was one of eight stations in the world that could guide submarines carrying nuclear missiles. Liberia was also the only country in West Africa where United States military planes could land with just 24 hours' notice, facilitating United States efforts to supply Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola forces in their guerrilla war against Angola's Marxist government.¹

After promoting himself to general, Doe dissolved the PRC in July 1984 and called for elections in October 1985. He lifted the ban on political activity but, despite earlier pledges not to run, declared himself a candidate and started calling himself the president. Doe created a puppet legislature composed of soldiers and members of his new National Democratic party of Liberia. In anticipation of the elections, several parties fielded candidates for the presidency and the legislature; Doe responded by cracking down on the most popular opposition parties and barring their leaders from participating in the electoral process.

Repression increased during the campaign. Amos Sawyer, now the leader of the Liberian People's party, was detained without charge, *The Daily Observer* was shut down again, and some candidates were arrested, detained, and flogged. Gangs of young men paid by Doe roamed the country, disrupting meetings and rallies and beating opposition candidates.

Although an open and robust campaign was impossible, the opposition would have won the October 15, 1985, elections had there not been massive vote fraud. As early returns came in it became clear that Doe would lose. He immediately ordered the Special Election Commission to burn ballots in a huge bonfire. Vote counting stopped and a new count by hand-picked Doe supporters was ordered; to no one's surprise, they found that Doe had received 50.9 percent of the vote and was Liberia's new president.

Doe stole the election, yet the United States, incredibly, recognized its validity. An American official in

¹Doe parlayed his anticommunism so well that he was invited to the White House in 1982, where President Reagan introduced him as "Chairman Moe."

Monrovia stated: "It was one of those rare times when United States foreign policy could have made the difference. We funded the election, we organized it, we supervised the voting, and then when Doe stole it, we didn't have the guts to tell him to get his a - - out of the mansion." Back in Washington, Chester Crocker, the assistant secretary of state for Africa, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "the prospects for national reconciliation were brightened by Doe's claim that he won only a narrow 51 percent election victory." Most Liberians thought otherwise.

One month after the elections, Thomas Quiwonkpa, one of the leading members of the original group of soldiers responsible for the 1980 coup, attempted to overthrow Doe. A popular figure who broke with Doe in 1983, Quiwonkpa had been subsequently forced into exile. News of his coup attempt led to joyous celebrations in Monrovia, but by midafternoon the coup had failed and Doe announced that he was in charge. Retribution was swift. For the first time ethnic tensions that had lain dormant exploded in a spasm of violence, the aftershocks of which are still being felt.

THE ETHNIC DIMENSION

Doe was from a small ethnic group, the Krahn, who live primarily in eastern Liberia near the frontier with Ivory Coast. Krahn make up only 4 percent of the Liberian population, yet Doe appointed Krahn in disproportionate numbers to key government posts; a Krahn directed government security forces and the army chief of staff was Krahn. Such blatant favoritism created growing resentment against the Krahn, particularly among the two largest ethnic groups, the Gio and the Mano (Quiwonkpa was a Gio).

After the failed coup, Doe and the Krahn-dominated army lashed out at Gio and Mano civilians, especially in Nimba county, which is Liberia's breadbasket and source of most of its iron and other valuable exports. As many as 2,000 Gio and Mano were killed after the failed coup—Quiwonkpa, who was from Nimba, was reportedly beaten beyond recognition, castrated, and dismembered. Hundreds of Gio and Mano soldiers were summarily executed on the grounds of the Executive Mansion. Krahn civilians reportedly helped soldiers hunt down non-Krahn in Doe's home base of Grand Gedeh county. No soldiers were ever prosecuted or disciplined.

A seemingly unstoppable cycle of ethnic violence had begun. A Krahn presciently told the Lawyers Committee in April 1986 that "We are in fact living in fear. . . . What I think is that, if there is an eventuality, if you know what I mean, there will have to be revenge. . . . We've got the feeling that something is in the making. When that thing explodes, then God have mercy on us." That "eventuality" exploded three years later when a former Doe ally and government official,

Charles Taylor, invaded Liberia with 60 men on Christmas Eve 1989.

However, even the Reagan administration had grown alarmed at the mounting evidence of unbridled corruption that accompanied the upsurge in ethnic hatred. In 1987 the United States sent a team of 17 experts to control and monitor the Liberian government's spending after the government defaulted on numerous loans. The team gave up in November 1988 and returned home. Yet Reagan administration officials continued to see "positive signs" despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The State Department's annual reports on human rights conditions in Liberia downplayed violations and gave a false impression of progress. Secretary Crocker testified again before Congress in 1987 that "We believe there has been a movement in a positive direction. If you take a moving picture, it shows a trend which we think is a good one. If you take a snapshot, then in that snapshot you can see problems. Problems are not absent, but the situation has improved."

Problems soon overwhelmed Crocker's "moving picture" and United States aid dropped from \$53.6 million in 1986 to \$19.5 million in 1989 and by 1990 had reached zero except for \$10 million in food and humanitarian assistance. The United States still failed to condemn publicly human rights violations as the Krahn took over from the Americo-Liberians as the new elite.

DOE'S DOWNFALL

As Liberia hurtled into economic disarray and intensifying repression, Taylor and his small group of guerrillas at first limited their targets to soldiers and government officials. Doe responded with predictable brutality, sending two infantry battalions to Nimba county where they killed, tortured, and arrested civilians, targeting Gio and Mano. Villages were burned and anyone suspected of harboring or supporting the rebels was at great risk. Soldiers reportedly told some villagers that they had "come to finish what they had started in 1985," referring to the bloody aftermath of Quiwonkpa's failed coup. Taylor's forces responded in kind, summarily executing Krahn civilians and widening their attacks to include Mandingos, who had become identified as pro-Krahn.

Each side committed atrocities throughout 1990. Doe told a group of tribal leaders that May to "get their cutlasses, their single-barreled guns and get in the bush." This was seen as a license to kill and in the next week the decapitated bodies of 18 people, all either Gio or Mano, were found in Monrovia. Taylor responded: "If you're a Mandingo, it doesn't matter who you are or what you've done. That's it. It's tit for tat." Taylor's forces swept through eastern Liberia and captured the port of Buchanan, Liberia's second-largest city and the transit point for most of the country's foreign currency-earning-exports. Taylor kept his word:

at least 200 people, many of them Mandingos, were lined up and shot after the city was captured.

The reaction of President George Bush's administration to the growing bloodshed and chaos was muted. Two counterinsurgency experts were dispatched to Nimba county allegedly to instruct Doe's forces on humanitarian principles and halt human rights violations. The United States was disturbed at reports that Taylor had received guerrilla warfare training and weapons from Libya, something Taylor consistently denied but his troops freely admitted. Despite the "special relationship" and the various military installations, one senior State Department official observed, "[t]he bottom line is, it's not in the United States's interest to get in the middle of this fight."

Taylor's troops, who now called themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), had grown to several thousand and had driven to within 30 miles of Monrovia by the end of July. At the same time, a rebel splinter group led by Brigadier General Prince Y. Johnson had taken over sections of Monrovia and was within a mile of the Executive Mansion. (Johnson, a Gio, had a falling-out with Taylor, who is part Americo-Liberian, accusing him of trying to reestablish Americo-Liberian ascendancy.) Killings based on ethnicity continued to grow and led to massive population dislocations. In its first year alone the war created an estimated 500,000 refugees, placing a heavy burden on neighboring states such as Ivory Coast and Guinea. Thousands flocked to Monrovia, straining the city's already overburdened relief capacity.

While the UN refused to act even after Doe's troops murdered 600 unarmed civilians—including mostly Mano and Gio women and children who had sought refuge in a Lutheran church—a little known regional group, the 16-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided to take action. For the first time ever a group of African states intervened militarily in another state. ECOWAS cited the regional instability caused by the massive flow of refugees and the dangers faced by foreign nationals from the war in Liberia as grounds for its intervention. The long-standing Organization of African Unity principle of nonintervention had been irrevocably breached.

THE REGIONAL ATTEMPT

Six members of ECOWAS—Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Mali—originally agreed to commit troops to a peacekeeping effort in early August 1990.² Although their mandate was to restore order and allow Liberians to choose their leaders in free and fair elections, all six countries were ruled by civilian or military dictatorships. The irony was not lost on Taylor, who immediately denounced the decision and promised to resist any foreign intervention, calling ECOWAS the "dictators' club." Taylor was particularly incensed at Nigeria's participation since he viewed Nigeria as

one of Doe's most important supporters; Nigerian troops comprised the bulk of the ECOWAS forces, known as the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Taylor followed up his words with action: his troops ordered 300 Nigerian nationals out of the Nigerian embassy and took them hostage. He also prohibited foreign nationals from leaving territory under his control. Prince Johnson had the opposite reaction; in fact, Johnson had taken foreign nationals hostage precisely to provoke foreign intervention.

The situation in Monrovia was deteriorating dramatically. Relief workers estimated that 50 to 60 people were dying daily from starvation or disease. The United States marines began an airlift of foreign nationals. In August a priest told *The New York Times*, "Monrovia is dead. . . . No activities. Dead bodies lie all over the place, houses are burned down, and warehouses are looted." The ECOMOG forces arrived in Monrovia in late August and Taylor's forces resisted. Taylor's NPFL attacked the port of Monrovia where the West African troops landed, but with help from Prince Johnson's troops, the West Africans established a secure area.

While professing neutrality, Taylor's unrelenting attacks forced the West African troops to adapt their mandate from peacekeeping to one of "peacemaking." ECOMOG's original charge allowed its troops to fire only if attacked first but the soldiers soon adopted more aggressive tactics. In mid-September, fighting escalated as NPFL and West African forces shelled each other's positions. In a highly embarrassing incident for the West African force, Prince Johnson captured Doe when he came to ECOMOG's headquarters and then tortured and killed him on September 10; the whole grisly episode was videotaped and broadcast. Meanwhile, hundreds of Krahn who had been besieged in the Executive Mansion were evacuated from the city and sent out of the country. Taylor exploited this incident, accusing ECOMOG of working to keep the Krahn in power and thus capitalized on the near universal hatred of the Krahn among Liberia's principal ethnic groups. As Doe's forces retreated they adopted a scorched earth policy, burning, looting, and killing while declaring "No president, no capital. No Doe, no Liberia."

A military stalemate ensued, with Taylor's NPFL controlling all the country except Monrovia. After a historic meeting of 14 African heads of state in Bamako, a cease-fire was reached in late November. Disease and starvation ravaged the country, however, as ECOMOG relief efforts were stymied by Taylor's refusal to allow aid shipments to areas under his control. Taylor created his own government with its capital in Gbargna in northern Liberia, where he formed a parliament dominated by NPFL supporters. Areas under Taylor's control have their own currency, banking system, government ministries, television network, and radio stations. Iron ore, diamonds, rubber,

and timber are shipped through Buchanan and the revenue goes directly into NPFL coffers. Trade with French and German companies seems especially brisk.

In April 1991 ECOMOG installed an interim government headed by Amos Sawyer but Taylor refused to recognize it. Efforts to reach a political agreement sputtered throughout the year until what was thought a breakthrough was reached in the Yamoussoukro Accords of October. Taylor agreed to encamp and disarm his soldiers under ECOMOG supervision in return for a decreased Nigerian presence in ECOMOG. Senegal agreed to send 1,500 troops, bringing total ECOMOG forces to about 7,000; elections were scheduled for April 1992. Yet Taylor stalled and refused to encamp or disarm his troops, although he agreed to allow West African troops to enter some territory he controlled. To complicate the situation further, remnants of Doe's army, known as the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO), attacked territory under Taylor's control near the border with Sierra Leone in March 1992. Taylor accused ECOMOG of complicity in this offensive and attacked its positions. In early June, NPFL troops killed six Senegalese soldiers they had captured; Senegal hastily withdrew all of its troops.

The November 1990 cease-fire completely unraveled in late August 1992 when fighting intensified between Taylor's forces and ULIMO. At least 20,000 refugees fled Monrovia to escape the violence in western Liberia. Taylor, charging that ULIMO forces wore ECOMOG uniforms and also used their trucks, called for the UN to send peacekeepers to replace the West African forces. Taylor's troops attacked and killed several ECOMOG soldiers and captured 400 after invading their base near Buchanan.

By mid-September, four armies were fighting near the Sierra Leone border: ULIMO battled against the NPFL and the Sierra Leone army fought the United Revolutionary Front, a Sierra Leonean guerrilla group supported by Taylor. Fighting spread to Monrovia's environs when NPFL troops attacked a government army base, followed by rocket attacks on Monrovia. ECOMOG imposed a curfew in Monrovia and an emergency ECOWAS summit meeting was convened in Cotonou, Benin. The West African states ordered all sides to respect the cease-fire by November 6 or face economic sanctions. ECOMOG forces also went on the offensive, capturing the international airport at Roberts Field from Taylor and bombing NPFL positions.

According to a UN relief official, 100,000 people had sought refuge in Monrovia and many civilians had been wounded in artillery duels between the NPFL and ECOMOG. Taylor's forces cut off Monrovia's water supply, precipitating fears of a cholera epidemic. In late 1992, a World Health Organization officer estimated that 3,000 combatants and civilians had been killed in Monrovia since the fighting began in mid-October. But

it took the murder of five American nuns in early November to propel Liberia back to the world stage. The nuns had worked for years teaching and running an orphanage in a Monrovia suburb that had come under NPFL control. Taylor denied his troops were responsible, but all available evidence indicates otherwise. Yet another ECOWAS summit met in Abuja, Nigeria, and called on all sides to cease hostilities by November 10. This call was ignored as Nigerian planes bombed NPFL positions and the latest cease-fire crumbled like all previous ones.

INTERNATIONAL INATTENTION

After years of inaction, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 788 on November 20, 1992, which states that the "deteriorating situation in Liberia constitutes a threat to international peace and security." The Council condemned the attacks on ECOMOG, requested Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to send a special representative to report on the situation, and imposed a "complete embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia." Shipments to ECOMOG, however, were exempted from the embargo. By this March, ECOMOG had solidified its hold on Monrovia.

The ECOWAS effort, while well-intentioned, has gone badly wrong. It is another example—including the failure of the Organization of American States in Haiti and the European Community in the former Yugoslavia—of a regional group trying to tackle a complicated situation while the international community sits on the sidelines. ECOWAS only stepped in after the UN ignored several pleas in 1990, including one from Italy's ambassador to Liberia, who requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council, saying, "The interdependence of nations no longer permits other nations to sit idle while one country plunges into anarchy and national suicide." The UN's tendency to defer to regional organizations needs reappraisal.

Serious mistakes were made: ECOMOG troops have had no training in peacekeeping or human rights. Little advice was sought or received from experienced UN peacekeepers. This lack of experience and training was magnified when ECOMOG's role changed from peacekeeping to peacemaking, an extremely difficult transition even for the most experienced group. Moreover, ECOMOG reportedly used Krahn soldiers as guides to flush out Taylor's forces, and ECOMOG soldiers have also looted and harassed civilians. While not even approaching the level of atrocities committed by government forces, the NPFL, and ULIMO, peacekeepers and peacemakers must act beyond reproach. ECOMOG is now seen as another fighting force and it will take concerted UN action, preferably the dispatch of hundreds of human rights monitors, to begin to address the stalemate in Liberia. ■

As a member of the international mission that monitored last year's elections in Angola, John Marcum says, "it was difficult not to get caught up in the desperate, wishful euphoria of the moment and believe that just possibly Angola and Angolans were on the brink of the political peace and economic reconstruction for which they had long yearned. [But it] became quickly apparent. . . that the winner-take-all elections were only a prelude to more suffering."

Angola: War Again

BY JOHN A. MARCUM

In 1975, after 13 years of anti-colonial insurgency and one year of transition, Angola's defeated Portuguese rulers abandoned their promise to hold free elections before independence and fled the country under duress. Angola then fell prey to an even more destructive form of conflict: 16 years of civil war—by proxy that pitted a Soviet- and Cuban-backed government against rebels supported by the United States and South Africa. It was from this horror that Angola finally emerged in 1991 with a new promise of an electoral transition to a peaceful political order.

War-weariness in the politically and economically debilitated society, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet empire—and along with it, the interest of cold war rivals in bearing the burden of an Angolan client state—created conditions favorable to a political settlement. However, the deep bitterness, distrust, and degenerative culture of violence inculcated by 30 years of fratricidal war promised to be difficult to overcome.

In the period immediately after they took control by military means in 1975, with a decisive assist from Cuban and Soviet troops and matériel, leaders of the nationalist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) acted with the zealotry and intolerance typical of revolutionaries intoxicated with new-won power. They banned opposition groups and jailed critics, repressed organized religion, barred independent trade unions, and declared the MPLA a Marxist-Leninist party with absolute control over the press, the economy, and the instruments of the state. The result was economic ruin, except for oil exports organized by and linked to Western petroleum companies.

Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos would ultimately acknowledge the wrongheadedness of these

MPLA policies—but suggest that the responsibility for them rested with historical forces. In an interview with the Lisbon weekly *Expresso* that appeared last July 18, dos Santos opined that Angola had been too "backward" and devastated by war for "the objective conditions" necessary for building socialism to exist. To justify a latter-day MPLA shift to market economics, he argued it was the collapse of the socialist system "not in Angola but in other climes, in other countries," that obliged Angola to search for "alternatives."

Exploiting popular grievances against MPLA misrule and benefiting from training and material and logistical assistance from South African forces based in neighboring Namibia, a reinvigorated National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) regrouped. From 1976 until the signing of the internationally brokered cease-fire in May 1991, the movement had mounted a steadily intensifying insurgency. Operating out of shifting bases in Angola's vast southeastern savannah country, UNITA extended its reach progressively northward, forcing the government to increase the armed forces to some 300,000 troops, to spend much of its estimated \$3 billion in annual oil revenues on the military, to acquire Soviet tanks and aircraft, and support a Cuban expeditionary force that numbered 50,000 at its height in 1988. Little money remained for economic reconstruction or development. By the mid-1980s the United States was providing "covert" support for the "anti-Communist" forces of UNITA—aid that by 1991 totaled some \$250 million.

For Angolans the tragedy was overwhelming. There were between 100,000 and 350,000 battle dead, and tens of thousands of land mine amputees. Perhaps half the country's estimated 10 million people had been displaced by the war, and a large portion of these were crowded into the relative safety of urban slums. Disease and hunger were rampant, and the entire country was suffused with fear and intolerance.

The impact of prolonged civil war on those who

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wage it is not easily measured. For UNITA, however, more than 20 years of nearly continuous guerrilla combat had seen it become dependent on the rural authority of traditional chiefs (*sobas*) for local political support and contaminated by the atavistic practices of burning, dismembering, and drowning “witches” and “sorcerers” suspected of disloyalty. The movement internalized values and practices at sharp variance with the democratic credo it espoused when presenting itself to American and other Western patrons. A reverential cult had developed around UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, a consummate political survivor and sometime acolyte of Mao Zedong and South African President P. W. Botha. Initially hailed as an anti-Communist hero and later denounced as a brutish psychopath by his British biographer, Fred Bridgland, Savimbi said of himself, “When you speak of UNITA, you speak of Savimbi.” UNITA radio referred to him regularly and grandiloquently as “Supreme Guide, Comrade, Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi.”

Evidence that a sinister malaise had taken hold of the movement mounted in 1989 when a popular UNITA Washington lobbyist, Tito Chingunji, fell from grace; he was recalled, tortured, placed under house arrest, and ultimately met his death at UNITA hands. His fate fit into a pattern of disappearances and deaths—or for the more fortunate, defections—among talented, Western-educated UNITA leaders such as Luciano Kassoma, Jorge Sangumba, Antonio Vakulukuta, and Wilson dos Santos, to name some of the more prominent examples. Unable to conceive that a movement they still patronized as a champion of democracy might have become a brutalized and brutalizing perpetuator of war, UNITA’s backers in the United States Congress rejected counsel that they investigate the guerrilla group and press it as well as the MPLA to reach a political accommodation.

ELECTION FEVERISHNESS

Angola approached its first-ever national elections last September 29 and 30 in an atmosphere of intense distrust. Both the civil war adversaries-turned-electoral contenders entered the combined presidential and legislative contest convinced they would win. The governing MPLA, which had abandoned the Marxist-Leninist ideology and rhetoric of its former Soviet and Cuban benefactors, counted on several factors to seal its victory. These included the reputation of MPLA President dos Santos for pragmatic, if less than decisive, leadership that set him apart from the dogmatism and corruption characterizing much of the MPLA state bureaucracy. Additionally, the movement controlled the levers of political patronage and power through centrally appointed provincial governors. And—a cru-

cial asset—it had a reliable, traditional class and ethnic (Kimbundu) urban following centered in the capital, Luanda, and its hinterland.

As the campaign unfolded from July on, the MPLA overcame self-doubt occasioned by the humiliation of having had to accept UNITA as a bona fide electoral opponent. Reflecting a growing sense of confidence, though with an undercurrent of foreboding, the MPLA’s party organ, *Progresso*, ran the headline, “Victory Is Certain! But the Struggle Goes On.”

UNITA’s electoral strategy capitalized on the aura of military prowess, discipline, and power surrounding Savimbi. The movement could count on rural, regional support within the country’s largest ethnic community, the Ovimbundu of the agriculturally rich central highlands, who made up between 35 percent and 40 percent of the population. Taking credit for the recently completed departure of all Cuban troops, and trumpeting the endorsement of prominent Portuguese supporters, UNITA’s newspaper, *Terra Angolano*, proclaimed: “Democracy Has No Limits: UNITA Will Win.”

Earlier, in a long, rambling speech at a July rally in the UNITA bush capital of Jamba that was little noted at the time but that would prove prophetic, Savimbi had said: “On the day that the election results are announced. . . I’ll be hiding in some corner in some section of [Luanda].” The MPLA, he said, is “going to lose the election, and is not going to accept the results.” At that point, there would be a “two- or three-week battle and those who are in the city are going to die.” He would want to know only one thing, he continued: “where the troops are that will fight with me against the enemy.” “Slowly and gradually,” according to the UNITA leader, his forces would enter cities held by the MPLA and wrest control from the usurpers.¹

In sum, on the eve of the election neither party accepted the notion that it might lose. Fraud was left as the only admissible explanation for such an eventuality, and both parties expected that their opponent would engage in it.

Fraud was exactly what Savimbi alleged as soon as the vote count, slowed by technical and logistical problems and voter inexperience, had progressed sufficiently for an MPLA victory to be projected. As returns solidified into a parliamentary majority of 129 deputies for the governing party, with 70 for UNITA and 21 for smaller, mostly regional parties, Savimbi charged wholesale cheating; he criticized favorable reports on the balloting coming in from many of the approximately 800 international observers operating under the umbrella of the United Nations Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM). Threatening a return to military action, Savimbi alleged that the MPLA was “stealing ballot boxes.” Contrary to unofficial returns being carried by local and foreign media, he said, the MPLA was “not winning”; “Angolan interests,” he warned, had to be placed above “accommodation with interna-

¹Quoted from “Transcription of the Entire Speech by Jonas Savimbi Made at Jamba, 17 July 1992.”

tional opinion." In language that suggested he saw the occasion as UNITA's first and last chance to gain power by political means, Savimbi declared on October 3: "It is necessary that the regime change, otherwise those who believe that they were born to rule will never again be removed from power even 50 years from now."

Seemingly there had been little thinking ahead and little contingency planning by those who brokered the May 1991 Bicesse Accords that served as the blueprint for the internal peace process, from cease-fire to elections. Neither the diplomatic troika of Portugal, Russia, and the United States nor the United Nations undertook to pledge that there would be follow-up international observation and verification of future elections. Neither the newly enacted electoral law, the governing MPLA, nor President dos Santos held out assurances of "another chance." In a memorandum dated November 19, the cabinet complained: "It is well known that in Africa, generally speaking, when the opposition fails to gain power through electoral means, it

makes use the allegations of fraud to explain its defeat." The memo failed to note that the MPLA had consistently rejected multiparty elections until it was obliged by military and diplomatic pressure to agree to them, or that instances in Africa of one free election being followed by another are rare.


But analysis of the results of the legislative elections provides an ample conspiracy-free explanation for what happened. Both the MPLA and UNITA carried their

core constituencies. The MPLA won in its traditional bailiwick of four provinces—Luanda, Bengo, Malange, and Kwanza Norte—receiving 874,000 votes (73 percent) while UNITA garnered 188,000 (16 percent). In its four-province core support area of Huambo, Bié, Benguela, and Cuando Cubango, UNITA came out ahead with 582,000 votes (57 percent) to 306,000 (30 percent) for the MPLA. As seasoned Angola analyst Gerald Bender has observed, what proved crucial was that outside their respective cores the MPLA outpolled UNITA in every instance, and by an aggregate margin of 944,000 votes (54 percent) to 578,000 (33 percent). It won in all 10 remaining provinces but Zaire, where the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) of

veteran Bakongo leader Holden Roberto gained a slim plurality.²

Savimbi and UNITA lost in outlying regions in the south, east, and far north, areas that they had expected to carry. Ethnic communities (Ovambo, Chokwe, Ganguela, Bakongo) in provinces such as Cunene, Lunda Sul, Namibe, Moxico, and Uíge were underrepresented in UNITA's top-

most ranks. Over time they had become alienated from a leadership that increasingly centered around Ovimbundu with regional and family ties to Savimbi. (UNITA's army, its counterintelligence operations, and its representation on the Joint Political-Military Commission established to oversee implementation of the peace accords, were headed by Savimbi's nephews.) In Huíla province, where the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church was particularly outspoken on the subject, and across the country as well, the widely publicized defections, disappearances, and deaths of highly placed UNITA leaders raised fears that a Savimbi-led organization prone to discovering "traitors" and "CIA plots" in its midst would prove more repressive



²The aggregate legislative vote for all 18 of the country's provinces was the MPLA, 2,124,000 (53.7 percent), and UNITA 1,348,000 (34.1 percent). I am indebted to Gerald Bender for these statistical compilations.

than the MPLA had in the past or would in the future, now that it was avowedly committed to reform.

Hapless third parties demonstrated their inability to convince members to subordinate personal ambitions, transcend regional loyalties, and unite as a plausible political alternative in the too few months allotted for organizing and campaigning before the elections. Aside from the FNLA in its longtime stronghold of Zaire province, the only regional party to make a significant showing was the Party of Social Renewal, which received 33 percent of the legislative votes in the eastern province of Lunda Sul. Overall, third parties garnered only 480,000 votes, or 12 percent of the legislative total.

Facilitated by the UN mission, voter registration drives signed up 4.8 million people out of an estimated electorate of between 5.3 million and 5.8 million. Over 4.4 million went to the polls. There, voter inexperience and illiteracy and untested ballot design and procedures led to the invalidation of 11 percent of the votes cast. In the absence of a credible third-party alternative, many voters appeared motivated more by fear of a potential UNITA despotism than belief that a corruption-plagued MPLA leadership had been converted to the democratic pluralism it had long disparaged.

FAIR OR FOUL?

Among the hundreds of international observers who fanned out over the country to spot-check and assess the fairness of the voting was a 39-member multinational team organized by the Washington-based International Foundation on Electoral Systems (IFES). As a member of that operation, which dispatched observers to eight of Angola's most populous provinces, this author witnessed the voting in cities of Cuito, Andulo, and a string of towns and villages along the war-wrecked Benguela railroad in Bié. In this UNITA core region, as in the other seven provinces observed, what the team saw convinced it that the election "constituted a proper and effective application of the mechanism of elective choice of political representatives." There were some technical irregularities. Election officials improvised and interpreted regulations pragmatically, but they almost invariably did so with the consent of delegates from the competing parties. They acted resourcefully to adjust the use and placement of ill-designed voting booths, reordered voting hours where there was no electricity, or adopted locally acceptable modes of ballot counting—essentially technical matters. Intimidation by riot police or soldiers did not materialize.

Voters stood patiently for long hours over two days, often in the blazing sun, to cast ballots at some 5,800 polling stations that ranged from urban schoolrooms to bush huts. Many election officials and party delegates were obliged to sleep sequestered on a polling room floor for two nights and, in the absence of electricity, to

await daylight on the third day to begin a laborious ballot count. They ate strange plastic-wrapped Meals Ready to Eat rations provided by the United States Air Force, and generally conducted themselves with a civic dignity and pride that drew praise from the international observers. The official statement of the IFES team declared that the election, held "in the extremely tense circumstances arising from the recent Angolan civil war, notably the fierce competitive relationship between the two major Angolan political parties," constituted a positive "milestone in the history of Angola."

On October 17, after a review conducted by 18 working teams composed of representatives from UNAVEM, the Angolan National Election Commission, and UNITA, and the UN secretary general's special representative in Angola, Margaret Anstee, the election results were formally endorsed. Irregularities in the electoral process, Anstee confirmed, had been "mainly due to human error and inexperience." There was, Anstee said, "no evidence of major, systematic or widespread fraud, or that irregularities were of a magnitude to have a significant effect on the results. . . nor, in view of their random nature, could it be determined that such irregularities had penalized or benefited only one party or set of parties." The elections, Anstee concluded, "can be considered to have been generally free and fair." The United States government and the European Community publicly concurred with the UN endorsement. UNITA radio on October 21 accused Anstee of having "sold her honor and dignity for diamonds, industrial mercury, and United States dollars" from dos Santos.

REALPOLITIK AND WISHFUL THINKING

During the final days of the campaign, a surrealistic, carnival atmosphere, a kind of festive political denial, prevailed in parts of the country. In Luanda, youths strolled the city wearing Savimbi T-shirts. Trucks and cars festooned with balloons and banners, bearing loudspeakers that blared political slogans and raucous music and transporting loads of partying partisans, made the rounds of the capital's streets and squares. Equitably rationed hours of television and radio time preempted Brazilian soap operas and enabled a plethora of parties and presidential candidates to present their cases to those with access to transistors or televisions. Flyers, posters, and leaflets adorned buildings and littered garbage-strewn streets. Whether citizen or international observer, it was difficult not to get caught up in the desperate, wishful euphoria of the moment and believe that just possibly Angola and Angolans were on the brink of the political peace and economic reconstruction for which they had long yearned.

It became quickly apparent, however, that the winner-take-all elections were only a prelude to more

suffering. Before the final vote tally for the presidency whittled an early dos Santos lead to 49.56 percent, a whisker below the 50 percent necessary to avoid a runoff, Savimbi had flown to Huambo, where he closeted himself with supporters, began to loose a barrage of vitriolic threats, and received phone calls and visits from diplomats from the UN, the United States, and other countries anxious to forestall a return to civil war. As UNITA allegations of electoral fraud escalated, Savimbi removed all UNITA soldiers from the belated beginnings of a unified national army and reintegrated them into his still-intact, strategically encamped, and well-armed forces.

In the political maneuvering that followed, the MPLA, which had demobilized a comparatively larger portion of its armed forces, announced on December 2 the formation of a government of "national unity." In a move to preempt repetition of past nativist charges by UNITA that it was a vehicle of urban, mestiço domination, Ovimbundu were appointed as prime minister (in the person of Marcolino Moco) and to the finance, agriculture, and justice ministries; UNITA, however, was offered only the ministry of cultural affairs and three vice ministries. This seemed less than a serious gesture of political reconciliation. For its part, UNITA turned resolutely to the military option it had carefully preserved.

Despite anxious efforts by the UN mission and other third parties to promote political discourse and pave the way for a presidential runoff election, violence steadily mounted. Breaking ranks with and undermining the diplomacy of the United States/Russia/Portugal troika, South Africa reverted to form and counseled "an African solution" rather than strict adherence to the results of a "Western" electoral process. Even as political negotiations in his own country seemed to be moving toward a fully national political accommodation, Foreign Minister Pik Botha rushed to support Savimbi, a former South Africa client. Adding to speculation that South Africans were proselytizing for ethnic separatism or a partition of Angola, Sean Cleary, the South African architect of an earlier imperfect and failed Namibian political system based on ethnic homelands, emerged as a kind of éminence grise for UNITA. Unverified reports that South African cargo planes were overflying Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe to deliver military supplies to UNITA multiplied as the political crisis deepened.³

In early November UNITA troops occupied a series of provincial capitals, including the northern town of Uige and the MPLA stronghold of Caxito, a mere 43

miles from Luanda. UNITA's soft-spoken, "moderate" vice president, Jeremias Chitunda, an American-educated mining engineer who had escaped the fate of his colleague Tito Chingunji and other peers by virtue of a "presidential pardon" from Savimbi, was killed along with several other UNITA officials attempting to run a roadblock and escape renewed fighting in Luanda. By mid-February of this year, UNITA troops had seized and sacked the oil center of Soyo on the northern coast and laid siege to the central highland city of Huambo. Militant hard-liners such as Information Secretary Jorge Valentim, known for fiery oratory even in his student days at Temple University, gained in influence within UNITA as advocates of accommodation lost ground. Correspondingly, dos Santos, who had taken the high road and delayed ordering military action against UNITA forces occupying MPLA core cities, came under sharp criticism from resurgent hard-liners in his own party. When the government did mount a stand at Huambo—more because of its symbolic importance as "Savimbi's capital" than its strategic value—with the use of residual air and armored vehicle weaponry from Angola's days as a Soviet client, it failed to defeat the rebels. In early March, MPLA forces, having waited in vain for rescue by a motorized column that never arrived, capitulated. Estimates of casualties suffered by the two sides in the battle for Huambo ranged between 10,000 and 15,000.

With this military success, Jonas Savimbi upped the UNITA preconditions for a resumption of talks. In a March 9 address to his followers, he demanded the withdrawal of Margaret Anstee as head of UNAVEM, railed against the "creole" culture of Luanda, warned that "murder plots" being hatched against him in Portugal would lead to retaliation against Portuguese residents in Angola, and boasted that his forces had the military stamina and determination to keep fighting until victory was theirs. In Luanda, meanwhile, 10 of 70 elected UNITA legislators defied party orders and assumed their seats in the Angolan parliament, undertaking to form the nucleus of a loyal opposition.

As fighting continued, United States officials were reported to be redoubling efforts to get the opponents back to the negotiating table and resisting pressure from European countries to recognize the MPLA government—as the Europeans had long since done—and take a tougher line with UNITA. If the handlers of foreign policy crises for the Clinton White House were preoccupied with Russia, Bosnia, and to a lesser degree Haiti, Iraq, and Somalia, what was the likelihood that a new Democratic administration would focus intensively on Angola anytime soon? It did seem to some observers, however, that negotiation of a power-sharing arrangement might now be possible, because UNITA's newly heightened prestige would make it easier to talk with the MPLA about a place in government commensurate

³The *Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg, February 26, 1993), reported that South African-acquired Russian Antonov transport planes were ferrying arms from the nominally independent homeland of Bophuthatswana to a UNITA transfer center in southern Zaire.

surate with the political support UNITA had demonstrated in the September elections.

Reflecting a growing pessimism at the UN, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali decided in late January that unless Angola's protagonists arrived at a political accommodation by April 30, he would recommend to the Security Council that UNAVEM withdraw and leave them to fight on in isolation. Such an abandonment of a peacekeeping operation, however, would constitute an unprecedented admission of failure for the organization.

LESSONS AND LEARNERS

A major flaw in the implementation of the 1991 peace accord was the failure of the UN and engaged governments to insist on the full demobilization of Angola's competing armies and their merger into a single national army before the elections were held. Instead, a Western military observer confided to the February 8 *Washington Post* that "UNITA forces came to the 'demob' sites and kept their command structures intact, while the government forces just sort of disintegrated." When fighting began again, disciplined and loyal UNITA forces were ready, while thousands of ex-government troops were out in the streets of Luanda rioting over their demobilization pay. The government was reduced to arming civilians to defend the capital.

The fateful failure of an understaffed UNAVEM effort to ensure strict compliance with the accord's military conditions, including an improvident decision to stick with the compressed schedule for carrying out the elections despite incomplete verification, was reasonably argued in an Angolan cabinet document dated November 19, 1992: "During the period between May 1991 and the carrying out of the elections, when there should have been strict compliance with the Bicesse Agreements, there were grave insufficiencies in the implementation of the chapters which refer to the military aspects that [are central] to its substance, and above all to the limitations of UNAVEM II, which did not have sufficient personnel to carry out its task of verification." Mounting such an international effort in Angola in haste and "on the cheap," hindsight suggests, led inevitably to local tragedy and risked discrediting the UN just as the organization was assuming major peacemaking and peacekeeping responsibilities worldwide. It had clearly been wishful thinking to believe that the warring parties of Angola could be reasoned into electoral accommodation.

Failure of the peace accord to provide for provincial or municipal elections in addition to the national balloting meant that for losing parties, even one

finishing a strong second, there was no prospect of winning a legitimized and compensatory regional or local power base from which to mount a future national electoral campaign. The zero-sum electoral equation was bound to encourage UNITA to return to the military option.

Assessing the Angolan experience for what it might signal for his country as it approached its own rendezvous with the electoral process, a South African observer, Paul Graham, in a report to the Institute for a Democratic South Africa, pointed to the importance of the following: preliminary education in citizenship in rural areas; special voter education programs for women and the elderly; effective coordination of domestic and international election monitoring programs; and recognition that specific voter education programs are no substitute for longer term general education for democracy. Above all, he had learned from Angola "that an election cannot replace a culture of democracy and a spirit of national reconciliation. These must be developed in other ways to ensure that a truly democratic election process is not undermined by a resort to violence, threats and a general unwillingness to accept defeat."

Such were the lessons from Angola that could be applied to South Africa, Mozambique—where preparations were under way for a national election to consummate political accommodation between a formerly Marxist government and a rebel army—and, potentially, to many other countries. In the wake of its electoral disaster, the anguished multitudes of Angola can only hope that, acting through the United Nations, the international community will press strongly for negotiated political compromise and make it starkly clear that those seeking total power by military means will be rejected abroad as they would be resisted at home. Learning from mishap and led by an American diplomacy free of cold war thinking, external intervention must promote political solutions. These solutions should fuse warring armies into a depoliticized security force, diffuse political power through provincial and local institutions and elections, guarantee human rights, and provide adequate international oversight. Otherwise, as the UN's Boutros-Ghali has conjectured, the renewed conflict may be "prolonged and bloody" yet "inconclusive," ultimately forcing the warring parties "to come back to the negotiating table." Less possible to predict in the prevailing climate of vengeful violence is how much new suffering and destruction Angola's third war will bring to a shattered people. ■

"With international assistance and patience, Mozambique could prove to be a democratic success story in a region that is sorely in need of one. Without it, the peace accords could become another hollow document and Mozambique a country returned to war."

Mozambique's Cautious Steps toward Lasting Peace

BY SHAWN H. MCCORMICK

After more than 16 years of war that claimed an estimated 1 million lives, displaced 5 million people, and caused \$15 billion in damage, the two warring factions in Mozambique have laid down their weapons and committed themselves to a lasting, democratic solution to one of Africa's most brutal conflicts. Although implementation of a United Nations-supervised peace accord is seriously behind schedule, both former combatants remain steadfast in their adherence to the accord's basic elements. Barring any unforeseen disasters, Mozambique will continue to confound pundits and proceed down the path of reconstruction and development.

The horrific nature of the war in Mozambique expanded the boundaries of the level of cruelty humans could inflict on one another. The mutilation of men, women, and children—the hacking off of ears, noses, lips, hands, and sexual organs—occurred with gruesome regularity. Yet these incidents—which, unlike the killing in Bosnia, remained untelevised—did not provoke a solution from the outside. Rather, the initiative for peace came from within.

A COMPLICATED PEACE

Twelve rounds of often torturous negotiations culminated on October 4, 1992, with the signing of a peace settlement by President Joaquim Chissano and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) leader Afonso Dhlakama. The negotiation effort by the Sant'Egidio Community, a Roman Catholic lay organization with long ties to Mozambique and close links to the Vatican, was undertaken with the assistance of a senior representative of the Italian government and Archbishop Don

Jaime Goncalves of Beira, Mozambique. At various stages numerous Western and African nations helped to further the search for peace.

The effort to begin negotiations was the result of a calculated strategy on the part of Chissano. Shortly after his ascension in 1986 to the leadership of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the presidency after the death of the country's first president, Samora Machel, in a plane crash, Chissano began to reform the economic and political underpinnings of the socialist state. The adoption of a structural adjustment program, which was outlined by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in 1987, was followed in July 1989 by the renunciation of Marxism-Leninism at the fifth party congress. The 700 congress delegates also supported Chissano's calls to accept a multiparty political system and begin negotiations with RENAMO.

Chissano continued Mozambique's move away from communism and ties with the Soviet bloc by expanding contacts with Western countries such as Britain, which was providing important military assistance, and the United States (despite serious differences of opinion in American decision-making circles), which was steadily increasing its foreign aid to Maputo. A calculated strategy to court South Africa resulted in Pretoria's public support for Chissano's peace efforts. The president also used a broad range of international contacts to highlight the plight of his nation, particularly at the humanitarian level, in an effort to isolate RENAMO.

In response to Chissano's actions, Dhlakama finally began to assert control over an organization that heretofore had failed to clearly define its political goals. At RENAMO's first party congress in June 1989, Dhlakama reorganized the group's National Council to include representatives from every part of the country, sacked all of the organization's overseas representatives on the grounds they were disloyal or corrupt, and promoted military chief of staff Raul Domingoes to the important post of secretary for external affairs. Follow-

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ing the congress, the RENAMO leader announced that he intended to negotiate an end to the war with FRELIMO.

The government also expressed its desire to discuss an end to the war. Chissano sanctioned a delegation of Mozambican clerics to establish contact with the guerrillas and asked Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe to serve as co-mediators. Both men were logical choices; Moi because of his leading role as an external supporter of RENAMO, and Mugabe because he had sent Zimbabwean troops to protect two vital transport corridors in Mozambique that allowed landlocked Zimbabwe access to Mozambican ports.

The first indirect contacts occurred in August 1989 and resulted in the presentation of multiple-point statements of principle by both sides. Although there was a strong desire to continue negotiations in the months that followed, RENAMO began to lose faith in Mugabe's role in the mediation process. The Sant'Egidio Community quickly stepped in and offered its services. Despite often difficult relations between the Catholic church and the Maputo government (just a year earlier Minister of Information Jorge Rebelo had called a group of Catholic bishops "Apostles of Treason" for issuing a pastoral letter urging direct FRELIMO-RENAMO talks), Chissano quickly accepted the offer. These difficulties between the church and FRELIMO provided a degree of common ground between the church and RENAMO; along with calling for the establishment of a multiparty political system, RENAMO had supported religious freedom.

Although the negotiating process began slowly, five rounds of peace talks under Sant'Egidio's mediation culminated in January 1991 with the two sides agreeing to a partial cease-fire and the creation of a Joint Verification Commission (JVC). In addition to monitoring the cease-fire, the commission was also given the task of monitoring the 5,000 Zimbabwean troops guarding the transit corridors to Beira, Mozambique, and the Limpopo River.

The positive atmosphere quickly dissipated the following month when RENAMO attacked a train traveling in the Limpopo corridor. Dhlakama challenged the neutrality of the JVC, claiming that it had failed to thoroughly investigate charges that Zimbabwean troops were stationed outside the corridors. The deeper cause was more likely fear and suspicion of FRELIMO's actions and intentions. RENAMO returned to full-scale fighting.

Despite the expiration of the JVC in June, discussions between the two sides continued as fighting raged across Mozambique. The United States began providing technical assistance to Sant'Egidio at this

stage. By October, the mediators had developed a foundation for mutual political recognition known as Protocol I on Fundamental Principles. In addition, both sides publicly endorsed a joint commission that would include the UN to "supervise and control fulfillment of the General Peace Accord."¹

As talks entered 1992, rapid progress was made. Agreement was reached by March on Protocols II and III, which clarified the rights of political parties and established an independent electoral commission. The United States began increasing its effort to promote a peaceful settlement, as did Portugal, France, and Britain. By summer, sufficient progress had been made for Chissano and Dhlakama to hold face-to-face talks. Their meeting was hastened by the worst regional drought in decades that was placing increasing strains on a devastated population.

On August 4, the two leaders met in Rome for the first time and three days later signed a declaration of intent to solve all outstanding issues by October 1. The differences remaining were substantial, however, and a second Chissano-Dhlakama meeting was arranged in Gaborone, Botswana, on September 18 to address these issues, which included the role the UN should play in guaranteeing the peace process, the composition of the integrated Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique (FADM), and the future role of the police and intelligence services. At the meeting an understanding on many remaining issues was quickly reached, and it was agreed that any unresolved problems would be resolved before a formal signing ceremony in Italy scheduled for October 1.

Following some last minute shuttle diplomacy between the two delegations in Rome, Chissano and Dhlakama signed the General Agreement of Peace on October 4. The Mozambican president told the assembled delegates and press that the ceremony represented "the end of the cycle of violence and confrontations. We have and will still have differences, but these must not be imposed above the interests of the Mozambican people." Dhlakama told the gathering that RENAMO believed in "democracy, freedom, justice, and human rights. . . . If we lose the elections, we will accept that we are in the opposition."

SLOW OFF THE MARK

Despite the sense of achievement following the signing, the provisions and timeframes outlined in the accords quickly proved to be optimistic and short-sighted. For example:

—The accords stipulated that 30 days following the ratification of the treaty by the Mozambican National Assembly (which occurred on October 15), Zimbabwean troops were to withdraw and UN troops were to begin arriving. The UN forces did not arrive on schedule and Zimbabwean troops temporarily remained in Mozambique.

¹Cameron Hume, "The Mozambique Peace Process" (Unpublished manuscript, December 1992), pp. 11–17.

—Government and RENAMO troops were mandated to assemble at 49 demobilization sites within 30 days of the signing “under the supervision and coordination of the United Nations.” By that date, however, no sites had been chosen by the two sides and there were no UN personnel in the country capable of undertaking this effort.

—The 30,000-strong FADM—trained by Portugal, Britain, and France—was to be created with equal numbers of forces from the government and RENAMO. This process was to begin on the day following ratification and be completed before national elections were held. Troops not included in the FADM were to be demobilized beginning 30 days from the ratification and complete demobilization was to be accomplished within 180 days.

Five months after the signing of the accord, these critical steps had not been initiated.

Despite the cease-fire mandated in the peace accords, fighting between the two sides did not stop in mid-October. Both government and RENAMO troops violated the cease-fire repeatedly. In the week following ratification of the treaty, RENAMO captured four district capitals reportedly in retaliation for the government’s occupation of RENAMO-held territory. By November 9 the four district capitals taken by RENAMO had been recaptured by government forces. Since these clashes neither side has reported any large scale violations; both concur that the cease-fire is being observed in all provinces.

Shortly after the cease-fire took effect, attention turned to reinforcing a basic pillar of the accords. Of principal interest to RENAMO was the continued presence of Zimbabwean troops in the Beira and Limpopo corridors waiting to be relieved by UN forces. Dhlakama visited Zimbabwe in early December and concluded after lengthy discussions with Mugabe that “it was pointless to force Zimbabwe to withdraw its troops from Mozambique before the arrival of the UN troops to monitor the peace accords. . . . In fact, the withdrawal of the Zimbabwean troops should be verified by the United Nations.” Dhlakama’s statement relieved many who feared that RENAMO might use the presence of Zimbabwean troops in the corridors to justify the movement of military forces or break the cease-fire.

OUTSIDE ACTORS FORMALIZE ROLES

Following intensive lobbying by Aldo Ajello, the UN secretary general’s special representative for Mozambique, the UN Security Council unanimously approved an official UN role in the Mozambican peace process on December 16, 1992. The UN Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) will deploy 7,500 soldiers, police, and civilians from member nations. FRELIMO and RENAMO have approved the appointment of Brazilian Major General Lelio Goncalves Rodriques da Silva as

military commander of UNOMOZ. Nine countries (Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cape Verde, Egypt, Italy, Malaysia, Sweden, and Uruguay) announced they will send troops to UNOMOZ. The United States has not been asked to commit military forces, but will likely provide some form of technical assistance or engineering support.

The mandate for UNOMOZ presently extends through October 31, 1993, and the operation is estimated to cost approximately \$330 million. In addition to peacekeeping, the duties of UNOMOZ will include the protection and repair of key roads and rail corridors, the removal of mines, and the disposal of superfluous weaponry.

Funding for the reconstruction of the country’s economy and infrastructure was addressed at a Paris meeting of the World Bank Consultative Group on December 8 and 9, 1992. Eighteen donor nations and seven international organizations including the World Bank pledged approximately \$760 million in financial assistance.

The following week \$320 million was pledged at a special Donors Conference held in Rome. The major topics addressed at the conference included financing to implement the peace accords, the provision of humanitarian assistance, the demobilization and reintegration into society of the rebel and government troops, and the establishment of a new electoral system.

Early this year, however, a consensus began to develop among FRELIMO, RENAMO, and Ajello that it was not feasible to hold elections within one year as stipulated in the peace accords. “Elections must be held only after the demobilization of troops,” Ajello said. “This fact implies some delay. They [FRELIMO and RENAMO] have accepted the idea of having this delay.” Elections, he said, would not take place any earlier than June or July 1994.

Questioned about the status of the peace process in late January, Ajello told the British Broadcasting Corporation that “I think I have all the reasons to be very happy because the cease-fire is holding very well. There is a lot of fraternization going on at the field level and there is such a will for peace not only at the level of the government and RENAMO but also at the level of ordinary people in the field that I am confident that it has been holding up to now and will keep hold.”

TASKS AHEAD

The two former combatants have begun to create a spirit of trust but a variety of issues remain as potential barriers to a lasting peace in Mozambique. It is important for the international community working with both parties to ensure successful resolution of these points to avoid any deviations from the peace accords.

Essential to the maintenance of a lasting peace is the

successful integration of the two warring armies into a single national military force. Once this process begins, there are doubts that RENAMO will be able to muster the 15,000 recruits who are to enlist in a new army, especially since a significant number of its present force is thought to be under the age of 16. Similarly, the government's largely press-gang army may also find it difficult to produce an equal number of willing participants for the FADM.

Less publicized but just as important will be the creation of jobs for those soldiers who are demobilized. In a country where a weapon (there are reportedly 500,000 AK-47s in Mozambique) often equals survival, the approximately 100,000 soldiers who will not join the FADM require an avenue for effective reintegration into society. Without this, the thousands of recently demobilized soldiers with easy access to weapons raise the specter of uncontrolled banditry.

Another potential problem centers on FRELIMO's incorporation of soldiers and former intelligence personnel into the national police force. Although not illegal, the transfer of men into a newly created and undefined security organization—without public scrutiny—has raised serious concerns. RENAMO claims that such efforts by the government have reached into the thousands of men, but FRELIMO claims the actual figure is much lower. The government says that the army previously had conducted functions normally assigned to the police such as border patrol and that the transfer of men is necessary to ensure peace and order in a civilian society. As Angola has demonstrated, this is a potentially explosive issue. There the government undertook a similar effort, which led its former military rival to claim that it was creating a separate military force.

A potential wild card in maintaining the cease-fire and repatriation of external refugees are members of the Napramas, an informal militia that also fought against RENAMO. Many thought that the organization would cease to exist after the recent death of its leader, Manuel Antonio. But this force (which went into battle armed with traditional weapons and "inoculations" made from herbs that were believed to stop bullets) has not disbanded. The Napramas were not included in the peace talks in Rome and some in its leadership are calling for the integration of its reported 20,000 members into the new national army.

In addition, if either of the vital rail lines linking Zimbabwe to the Mozambican coast is attacked, President Mugabe may reinsert his forces to ensure safe passage of goods into Zimbabwe. This could easily re-ignite the civil war between FRELIMO and the government.

Add to these problems a worsening drought that will affect 3 million people unless substantial humanitarian supplies are forthcoming and the picture for the immediate future is somewhat more problematic.

Mozambique has the highest "misery index" rating in the world with at least 5 million of the total population of 16 million in desperate need of food, medicine, and assistance. The 1991 harvest was poor and the southern African drought has wiped out crops in most fertile areas. Although occasional rains fall, famine on a larger scale than was seen in mid-1992 in Somalia could break out in Mozambique in 1993.

Roads in regions previously occupied by RENAMO forces have been opened to international aid organizations and general traffic. However, many roads are in need of repair and numerous land mines require removal. This has created logistical problems for the delivery of relief shipments to remote areas as thousands of villagers have flocked to the transportation corridors in search of assistance.

The repatriation and reintegration into society of approximately 5 million internal and external refugees is another major task. The process will be time consuming as well as labor intensive, especially when settling property disputes. In addition, RENAMO has said that it will not allow the registration of Mozambican voters in refugee camps either inside or outside the country.

Significantly, Dhlakama has yet to visit Maputo since signing the peace accords. RENAMO has repeatedly claimed that the government has not been forthcoming in accommodating its demands for living and operating quarters in Maputo. Although RENAMO opened a political office in Maputo on January 15, Dhlakama has refused to move to the capital, claiming that the residence set aside for him is not sufficiently secure. Dhlakama may not feel safe in the capital until there is a sizable UN presence in the country.

Yet another potential problem is the financial shortfall RENAMO is currently experiencing as it converts itself from a military organization into a political one. Sources indicate that the Italian government is considering providing limited financial resources to RENAMO to forestall any interruption in the peace process; various reports indicate that the RENAMO delegation in Maputo is unable to pay meal expenses for its representatives.

One bright spot is that Mozambicans have at least had an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the other Lusophone country in southern Africa that has gone through the throes of a similar process. In Angola a central error in the peace accords was to delay proceeding with the electoral process until the military had been demobilized. UN representative Ajello has made it clear that elections will not be held in Mozambique until demobilization has been completed. Moreover, unlike Mozambique, in Angola the UN had an extremely limiting mandate without any peacekeeping forces.

Another ray of hope lies in the climate of peace that exists in the country. This atmosphere will enable

people to rebuild the country and promote development. Recent visitors to Maputo marvel at the freedom with which people travel throughout the country, something that was unheard of until the signing of the accords. But it is important to remember that this could quickly change depending on the desire of both former combatants to uphold the foundations of the peace accords.

THE ROAD TO ELECTIONS

The election process in Mozambique will cost an estimated \$80 million. The government has already established that it is looking to the international community for assistance in covering this significant expense. Still to be resolved are basic questions concerning issues such as voter registration, the training of polling staff, and the distribution of election materials.

As of early 1993, 17 political parties had officially declared their intention to compete in multiparty elections. Many of them maintain their base of support with a single ethnic group and none has been able to develop a significant national standing; only FRELIMO and RENAMO have strong recognition across Mozambique (and even this may be misleading since some Mozambicans know virtually nothing of their country).

For RENAMO the most daunting task is successfully transforming itself from a loose military organization into a political force with a coherent agenda and message for the people of Mozambique. It is no longer sufficient for RENAMO to oppose FRELIMO policies. Dhlakama must develop and enunciate a clear agenda

on how he would lead Mozambique if he wants to win the elections. The reported lack of educated senior RENAMO officials complicates this task.

Interestingly, Dhlakama has made several statements that an electoral victory may not be foremost on his mind. "I have fought for democracy. Democracy has been won. Dhlakama has won democracy for the people. That is why we will contest the elections. Personally, I do not find it important to talk about elections. If the people vote for RENAMO and we win the elections, then I will rule the country. But if we lose the elections we will be in the opposition."

Perhaps the most serious opposition to FRELIMO exists within the party. But the organization has proved that despite its propensity for political infighting the leadership will close ranks in order to assure victory. This is not to say that FRELIMO will easily garner the support of the population. On the contrary, 18 years of unrepresentative government and simmering ethnic tensions should combine to create a lively political atmosphere. The parliament will most likely represent a wide range of actors, parties, and viewpoints.

Delays in implementing the peace accords have put additional strain on the government and RENAMO to guarantee the peace. Expectations on both parties have been raised considerably and they have each performed admirably. With international assistance and patience, Mozambique could prove to be a democratic success story in a region that is sorely in need of one. Without it, the peace accords could become another hollow document and Mozambique a country returned to war. ■

"One can discern a pattern by which South Africa progresses fitfully toward democracy. . . . Whether this will eventually lead to a transfer of power is not entirely clear. Whether it will lead to an improvement in the lives of South Africa's masses is even less certain. But given the hostility and distrust that is South Africa, it is amazing that cooperation has progressed this far."

South Africa's Tortuous Transition

BY KENNETH W. GRUNDY

A sense of frustration and despair pervades South Africa these days. It is not that progress has not been made, or that the promise of majority rule is not greater today than it was 10 years ago. Rather, a profound pessimism follows on the heels of events that had many, especially among the black majority, believing the transition to nonracial democracy would be direct and unswerving.

No one predicted an entirely peaceful transition—after all, South Africa has not known peace since the 1976 Soweto uprising. And the "peace" that preceded the uprising was predicated on grave social injustice, economic exploitation, political division, and the intimidation and violence of a police state determined to hold on to power. But then came the release of political prisoners—including Nelson Mandela—the unbanning of anti-apartheid organizations, the March 1992 referendum in which whites strongly approved continuing negotiations for a nonracial democracy, and the granting of amnesty for detainees and returning political exiles. The government and the African National Congress (ANC) reached a succession of agreements culminating in the multiparty talks known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). But those who began to believe the transfer of power would be just a matter of time had their hopes shattered last May and June.

SETUP FOR A BREAKDOWN

Nineteen political groups gathered outside Johannesburg for CODESA in December 1991, and signed a declaration stating their intent to negotiate a new constitution and lay the foundations for a democracy in which all groups could live in peace. The principal

actors here were the ruling National party and the anti-apartheid and nonracial ANC. The Democratic party, the liberal opposition in parliament, played a facilitating role. All the other parties attending CODESA, however, were there to protect their strongholds and particular interests. The Inkatha Freedom party of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, with its power base in the KwaZulu homeland, had sought to gain separate representation at the talks for the Zulu king, but mainly feared that the two dominant parties would decide the country's fate without it.

On the outside, refusing to take part, were the right-wing Conservative party and the extraparlimentary right. Each had been pulled apart by factions worried they would be totally marginalized by boycotting the talks. The far left also declined to participate; the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) appear to oppose any direct compromise with the government.

The National party and the ANC made surprisingly rapid progress at first. But still to be resolved was the question of the geographic distribution of power—whether the new South Africa should have a federal, confederal, or unitary structure, and precisely how powers would be allocated among the regions under that structure. The issue on which CODESA eventually broke down (although one could argue the real reason was that the government could not come to terms with actually relinquishing power) was how large a "special majority" would be required for decisions on a final draft constitution. Only a few percentage points separated the government and the ANC, but last May, after five months of negotiations, the latter walked out.

By quitting CODESA and breaking off formal talks with the government, the ANC sent two messages—one to President F. W. de Klerk, telling him to speed up progress toward democracy, and one to its own grassroots supporters, letting them know it was not going to allow the white minority regime to dictate the pace and pattern of change. In June the Congress

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prepared to unleash a mass action campaign that would solidify its popular support and force the government to return to the bargaining table.

South Africa, however, descended into violence more frightening and malevolent than in the past. The townships had always been violent: 8,000 people died in politically motivated incidents from 1990 to mid-1992, and from January to April of the latter year an average of eight political killings took place every day. But on the night of June 17, 1992, tensions between Inkatha and ANC sympathizers boiled over. Nearly 200 Zulu residents of a hostel controlled by Inkatha allegedly rampaged through Boipatong township; the attackers killed at least 40 people and injured dozens more. The brutality of the massacre, the authorities' alleged assistance to and protection of the hostel dwellers, and the resultant international outcry provoked a wave of violence during July and August that plunged South Africa into despair about the transition to democracy. Voices were raised calling for renewed sanctions against the country, and in August South Africa was suspended from participation in the Olympic games.

With Mandela, Buthelezi, and Foreign Minister R. F. Botha taking part, the UN Security Council debated and then unanimously approved Resolution 765, a relatively even-handed condemnation of the situation in South Africa. The resolution called on the government to "bring an effective end to the ongoing violence"; it also urged all parties' cooperation in implementing the National Peace Accord signed by the National party, the ANC, and Inkatha the previous September, in which they pledged to discourage violence. The Security Council invited Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to appoint a special representative to recommend measures to end the violence and to reopen negotiations for a peaceful transition to a democratic, nonracial, and united South Africa. Former United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, already deeply preoccupied with the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a special UN envoy, was dispatched to South Africa in July. His report called for the release of any remaining political prisoners and investigation into the operations of the security forces. A further Security Council resolution authorized the deployment of UN observers to South Africa; 50 were sent in September.

THE "SECURITY" FORCES AND INSECURITY

Aside from the UN actions, there were several ongoing efforts to examine the violence, and in particular the security forces' involvement in it. Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists both issued reports in mid-1992 that criticized the police as ineffective and partisan and contributing to the violence. The government dismissed the groups' findings as "one-sided" and "an almost complete whitewash of the African National Congress." For their

part the international monitoring agencies documented officially sanctioned killings by "death squads" composed of ex-security force members. They accused the police of being reluctant to investigate allegations, of failing to prosecute wrongdoers, and of actively assisting vigilantes who are responsible for some of the terror.

The government itself had in 1991 established the Goldstone commission to investigate a wide array of violent activities. Judge Richard Goldstone has an extensive brief, but operates with limited powers of subpoena, lack of vigorous cooperation from the South African Police and the South African Defense Forces, and far fewer investigators than are needed. Still his commission does commendable work. Its reports often accuse specific police and defense forces operatives of inefficiency and worse, and make urgent recommendations, some of which the commission says the government ignores.

It is difficult to argue that highly placed officials and members of the government did not know about and give tacit approval for many violent acts. Moreover, direct state complicity in the violence is not the only issue; culpability extends to acts of commission and omission at lower levels, and to rogue activities by state operatives or former state officials over whom the government seems to have lost control. For several years now the alternative press has, through determined investigative reporting, documented numerous instances of murder, terror, harassment, and other dirty tricks aimed at undermining the ANC and protecting the government, Inkatha, and government-assisted vigilantes. In December, after the Goldstone commission's disclosure of a covert military plot to discredit the ANC, President de Klerk admitted the military had waged a secret campaign against opposition groups, possibly involving killings.

The government alone is not to blame for all the violence. Indeed, it has sought to lay much of the responsibility for township violence on the doorsteps of the ANC and Inkatha. It has tried to create for worldwide consumption the image of pervasive "black-on-black" violence, with Pretoria's undermanned forces caught in the middle, doing their best to separate an ANC and Inkatha locked in a bloody struggle for control. The government has also tried to blame the violence on the ANC's campaign of mass action. But arguments along these lines ring hollow after de Klerk's admission that elements in military intelligence have instigated violence by manipulating cleavages in the black community. Such schemes contribute to disillusionment among the people and in the ANC and to the further fragmentation of black political forces. So while the National party is negotiating with the African National Congress, it is also undermining it.

THE TROUBLE WITH MASS ACTION

The ANC's campaign of rolling mass action involved a number of tactics, including the occupation of government buildings and city centers, a general strike and local wage strikes, marches, agitation aimed at those implicated in the violence, mass meetings to link local issues to national demands, and a campaign to democratize the state-run electronic media. All were nonviolent by design. It would appear that the movement's leaders rejected the so-called Leipzig option, ostensibly employed in East Germany to great effect: a series of general strikes and protest marches on such a large scale and so intimidating that a demoralized government and its supporters quickly negotiate the transfer of power. But the ANC recognizes its organizational limitations, and it has decided that Pretoria cannot be moved in this fashion.

Nevertheless, it would appear that some variant of the Leipzig option was contemplated for use against the homelands to undermine bantustan governments hostile to the ANC and in league with the National party and Inkatha—the object being to force these governments to permit open political activity by the Congress and ultimately to reincorporate these territories into the new South Africa. But the opening salvos in this campaign proved disastrous.

Last September the ANC, under pressure from militants, organized some 50,000 supporters to march three miles from King William's Town to the "border" of Ciskei and then to the football stadium in Bisho, the homeland's capital. When they reached the border, a group led by the Communist party's Ronnie Kasrils bolted through a break in the fence and was met with gunfire from the automatic weapons of the Ciskei Defense Force. Twenty-eight people were killed and scores were wounded. Ciskei's ruler, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, propped up by officers from South African military intelligence, was not about to allow the ANC to "occupy" his capital or mobilize the mass of disaffected Ciskeians.

Although the Congress has talked about similar mass marches against Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu, its national executive urges prudence, knowing that failure to negotiate in good faith will only prolong the stalemate and delay the ANC's eventual assumption of power. But the more it negotiates with the government, which of necessity entails compromise, the more its militant followers cry "sellout." However, the ANC lacks the grassroots organization that would enable it to demonstrate convincingly to the government that failure to move rapidly toward democracy would bring its supporters into the streets in disciplined displays of people power. It is the ANC's ally, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, that commands such a structure.

The people favor the goals of the ANC, but they see little progress in their lives. Their economic condition

worsens while their physical security is endangered. The ANC does not protect them, and they watch their leaders sitting down at the bargaining table with a government whose security apparatus they hold responsible for much of the killing; at the very least, the state fails to shield them from Inkatha's fighters, local warlords, or the "third force" of ex-defense forces and police assassins.

The ANC must demonstrate political results, and to do so its leaders feel that they must bargain with the government. That in itself seems to alienate young militants and impatient local leaders. It is just this perception of distance between party heads and the masses that fuels Winnie Mandela's calculated return to the limelight. The former wife of the ANC's preeminent leader, Nelson Mandela, appears to be rebuilding her political career by siding with the downtrodden poor and the ANC's rank-and-file and militant youth. So far the ANC's leadership has not been able to overcome the widespread fear that they may cut a deal with government at the people's expense.

STARTING AGAIN

The heightened violence sparked by Boipatong, international pressure, and a growing sense that the situation was getting out of hand led to a new round of negotiations. On September 26 de Klerk and the ANC signed a "Record of Understanding" by which the two principals backed away from their confrontational course. Included among the terms, which eventually formed the basis for a more detailed January 1993 agreement:

1. A democratically elected constituent assembly to draft and adopt a new constitution. It will be elected within an agreed length of time and will have a fixed time-frame; certain majorities will be necessary for certain kinds of decisions. The assembly will also act as an interim or transitional parliament, and there will be a transitional government of national unity.
2. The release of all political prisoners.
3. A promise by the government to quell violence at workers hostels such as the one from which the Boipatong killers supposedly came.
4. A pledge by the government to issue a proclamation prohibiting the carrying and display of dangerous weapons at all public occasions, subject to a few exemptions.
5. Acknowledgment by the government of the right of all parties to participate in peaceful mass action in accordance with the National Peace Accord.

His pride injured, Chief Buthelezi fumed and blus-

tered at being left out of these talks. He canceled a scheduled meeting with de Klerk and convened a meeting in early October with a number of bantustan and right-wing white leaders. Together they rejected the Record of Understanding and bemoaned their growing marginalization in the negotiation process. They demanded self-determination and strong, even autonomous regional powers to protect their minority interests.

Despite the frightening prospect of an alliance between Inkatha and the radical right, the Record of Understanding helped break the four-month impasse. The Ciskei massacre, also in September, created a sense of urgency on the government side. So the negotiation process was back on track—at least between the ANC and the government. To be sure, violence continues.

DE KLERK AND THE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT

At the national level, not all executive and managerial officials share the same agenda. Disparate groups in each community refuse to go along with the Peace Accord, or lack the discipline to control their militants. Secretive and violent operatives in the South African police, the South African Defense Forces, Inkatha, Umkhonto we Sizwe (the ANC's military arm), and the KwaZulu police ply their disruptive trade; disclosures about their activities appear almost daily in the press.

Last August the government announced sweeping reforms of its police force, including the forced retirement of one-third of the top command. Although the ANC called the changes a "face-lift," the move rid the force of some of the hard-liners known for resisting reforms. It also cleared the way for the promotion of black officers, long denied a place in the topmost ranks.

While the government was negotiating with the ANC, its military intelligence, through a network of front organizations and other clandestine operatives, was hard at work organizing attacks on ANC supporters and discrediting the Congress in the townships and abroad. There is ample evidence that military intelligence was actively promoting divisions in black politics and fomenting violence among blacks.¹

By late last year de Klerk could hold out no longer. He dismissed or suspended 23 military officers (including 6 generals) accused of engaging in illegal dirty tricks against black organizations. He admitted that elements in the military had been waging a secret campaign against opposition groups. But the president insisted that top government officials had been unaware of the illegal activities uncovered by the Goldstone commission and by an investigation of the military that he ordered.

In fact, de Klerk continues to protect cabinet officers. In October he rammed through parliament a bill that enables him to grant amnesty from prosecution for crimes with a political motive. The principal beneficiaries will be the police, the armed forces, and government officials who authorized, organized, or committed murders and massacres against the ANC's leaders and followers. Any political crime committed before October 9, 1990, is covered; there are to be no trials, no public disclosures, and no mention of the offenses in question—only a secret hearing before a commission appointed by the president. All that will appear in the public record is a list of names of those granted immunity from future legal action.

De Klerk is in an awkward position. He cannot move reform along when arms of the state destroy trust by engaging in violence. Yet if he seeks to purge the security forces or to bring the perpetrators of violence to book, he may further alienate his constituents. And de Klerk fears a further purge may cost him the backing of the security forces at the very moment when the risks of a traumatic transition are greatest. He needs the forces, even though they jeopardize compromise and reform, and so he waffles, trying to rein them in without panicking them. The thrust of his actions so far tends toward protecting those in charge of the alleged criminal elements in the security establishment.

REVELATIONS AND PROVOCATIONS

The ANC faces its share of embarrassing breaks in discipline. The most highly publicized of these have been the revelations about ANC detention camps in Angola and Zambia. From 1979 to 1988 the ANC's security department in exile lived in fear of government spies and assassins. ANC members were accused of treason, detained without trial, tortured, and in some cases, killed by their fellow partisans. The innocent and the guilty were lumped together. Under considerable pressure to admit its errors and clean house, the ANC conducted a seven-month internal investigation. The report concluded that for most of the 1980s there existed in the party's security apparatus "a situation of extraordinary abuse of power and lack of accountability." The ANC owned up to wrongdoing, and seems to have ended such practices. But it did not name the individuals responsible for the horrors, and appears to have done little to remove the abusers from key positions or otherwise punishing them.

Inkatha likewise has been implicated in the establishment of hit squads and the sanctioning of KwaZulu police violence unrestrained by law. Each party in the current political contest has its members who are convinced they are engaged in a fight to the death and that their enemies use illegal violence in the bid to destroy them. In such an environment, rife with suspicion and danger, overtures to reopen channels of

¹See for example *The New York Times*, December 20, 1992, p. 1.

communication are problematic. Buthelezi compounds the problem by threatening unrest should the government and the ANC move ahead with their plans.

To this mix must be added the military wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress, the Azanian People's Liberation Army, which in December launched sporadic attacks on "soft" targets in the Orange Free State and the border and eastern Cape districts; five whites have been killed, and dozens more injured. While many Pan-Africanist leaders oppose talks with the government, there is division in the party, with some considering joining the negotiation process. Some observers thus see the attacks on whites as attempts by Pan-Africanist radicals to discourage contacts between the government and the movement.

GETTING TRANSITION BACK ON TRACK

The scene is set for the ongoing minuet of bilateral talks leading back to a multiparty conference. Just what form the multilateral phase of negotiations will take will be very difficult to work out, since the emerging consensus between the ANC and the ruling National party on how the agenda is to be shaped must be sold to the other parties. Meanwhile the various parties, particularly those on the fringes, grope about for allies. The competition for political power is well under way, and only the ANC seems confident of its popular appeal. Still, that appeal may not be broad enough to enable the Congress to outflank its many opponents, should they join together against it.

Parties in South Africa fall into two categories—those that know their appeal is bounded and that realize they will be marginalized in a free and fair one-person, one-vote election, and those that do not fear such a poll. Parties of the first type seek to preserve their interests by building loose coalitions and by entrenching their powers territorially with federal schemes (in the case of various homelands groups and white separatists), or legalistically, through bills of rights and guaranteed arrangements for power sharing. For them, coalition-building has meant byzantine and untrustworthy arrangements for immediate advantage.

The ANC, which falls into the second category, may hope to win a majority in forthcoming elections, but that alone cannot guarantee its rule. Elements in the white electorate have the capacity to frustrate majority rule, since they possess inordinate military or economic power. Thus the ANC has sought to cooperate with the government and to wean the National party away from its "natural" allies on the periphery of power.

De Klerk wants power-sharing in an interim or transitional government, and what's more, he wants to prolong the transitional phase. In January, however, the government backed away from its demands for constitutionally entrenched and permanent power-sharing, and settled for a five-year period. The ANC

prefers a briefer interval of what it calls a government of national unity, but has reluctantly accepted a five-year transition.

Protection of minority parties and their interests is crucial. In the January compromise, the government dropped its insistence on prior entrenchment of regional powers in return for the ANC's agreement that half the seats in the constituent assembly would be apportioned by regions, and that questions of regional power would require a decision by a two-thirds majority in that body. Inkatha still insists on a federal system with autonomy for each of its four regions.

A tentative scenario for transition looks like this. In March, 25 of 26 participating delegations to a planning conference agreed on procedural issues that would lead to multiparty talks in April. There, efforts will be made to arrive at a consensus on peaceful participation in the transition and to formulate binding constitutional principles. Preparations, meanwhile, would then begin for a nationwide election for the constituent assembly, based on proportional representation; assuming that all goes well, the election would take place early in 1994. The 400-member assembly would draft a constitution and serve as an interim parliament. A president would be chosen from the party with the most seats in the assembly, and the winning party would invite any party that received at least five percent of the vote to participate in a unified government for a five-year period. The president would be obligated to secure cabinet approval on major decisions, including two-thirds approval on certain yet-to-be-specified fundamental issues.

The Pan-Africanist Congress and Inkatha have denounced this arrangement arrived at by the ANC and the National party. The government worked hard to get the arrangement firmly guaranteed in advance. The ANC, however, sees it merely as a practical product of an electoral victory that will not carry all necessary governing power along with it. Such promises, the Congress feels, are necessary to prevent a "counterrevolution" by white civil servants and security forces and to assure investors of a stable economic climate. Still, it was not easy selling these compromises to the ANC's national executive committee.

One can discern a pattern by which South Africa is progressing fitfully toward democracy. Slowly a series of major agreements has been hammered out; each successive one builds on its predecessors. Meanwhile the violence continues, sometimes leading to confrontation and the scuttling of talks. But through it all there has been positive movement between the ANC and the National party. Whether this will eventually lead to a transfer of power is not entirely clear. Whether it will lead to an improvement in the lives of South Africa's masses is even less certain. But given the hostility and distrust that is South Africa, it is amazing that cooperation has progressed this far. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

After Apartheid: The Future of South Africa

By Sebastian Mallaby. New York: Times Books, 1992.
275 pp., \$22.00, cloth; \$12.00, paper.

After apartheid's defeat comes the really hard part: the construction of a just South Africa.

Sebastian Mallaby, who coordinates *The Economist's* Africa reporting, proves himself both an extremely reflective journalist and a political scientist with a keen news sense. The last country on earth to run on institutionalized racism is transforming itself, and the choices it makes, Mallaby makes readers feel, will echo throughout black Africa and beyond.

The book begins almost cinematically, with Nelson Mandela's release from jail in February 1990, our reporter watching as the public celebration turns into a melee. The belief that the world's most famous prisoner, once free, would work wonders quickly gave way to the frustrations of hammering out a political structure acceptable to the country's various races and groups. The author vividly sketches the characters in the drama, from Winnie Mandela to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi to Piet "Skiet" ("Shoot") Rudolph, known as the Boer Pimpnel, out on the diehard right fringe, and gives a good sense of the many upwardly mobile blacks and moderate whites in the middle who might form the foundation of the future South Africa.

The problems the country faces after apartheid—constitution-writing and nation-building, the glaring socioeconomic inequities blacks will expect a black government to immediately fix, AIDS, the modernization of rural areas, psychological obstacles, even the traditional belief in witchcraft—are all surveyed in these pages, carefully and from different sides. But Mallaby crafts from the dilemmas and possible solutions that might have made a standard "think piece" an absorbing meditation/narrative that is never schematic or detached.

Unlike many other writers on the country who are absorbed with the political ramifications of the transition to a nonracial democracy, this one seems even more concerned with the economic implications for Africa's only advanced industrial nation. Mallaby runs through causes for optimism such as the relatively large class of black professionals, and reasons to invest elsewhere, ranging from the fall in the price of gold to the hesitancy of African National Congress (ANC) when it comes to the economy. He asks the opinions of white captains of industry steering conglomerates the size of governments; he also notes that in a highly

informal poll a few years ago of students studying economics at a black and mixed-race university, one-third said they were social democrats, another third said they were Marxists, and the remaining third claimed to be Trotskyites.

The book went to press in December 1991, just as the 200 delegates to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa were beginning negotiations, but the contents hold up well. The talking and transitioning have often bogged down, but Mallaby says firmly that the government and the ANC have no alternative but to work together for reform, and so will. He assumes the ANC will end up as senior partner in a coalition government with one or two whites in the cabinet—just what the papers were saying yesterday.

Mallaby does not shy away from treating the violence committed by blacks against blacks that has been the most frightening side effect of change. He traces the government's longtime strategy of building up artificial distinctions between South Africa's "tribes," and shows how the culture of resistance, boycott, and strikes that developed over the decades of the fight to end apartheid has bred a strange passivity among elders and a generation of ungovernable youths begging to be sent into action by unscrupulous ringleaders. So garbage piles up in the township streets, and young people who make a political statement by not attending school and for whom there are no jobs kill their fellow blacks for "political" reasons; "ungovernability, once embarked upon," Mallaby says, "is appallingly difficult to reverse."

It may already be too late for Somalia, Liberia, and Angola. Mallaby, more than most, considers the big picture in Africa. (Indeed, this strength grows out of a possible weakness—that the journalist was based in Zimbabwe during his relatively brief residence in Africa, and probably has a better grasp of the continent as a whole than the situation on the ground in South Africa. He does, however, take the trouble to visit and feel the pulse of the country's dangerous townships and remote homelands.)

As South Africa studies the economies of East Asia and the language of the United States Constitution, so the politically repressed and gravely underdeveloped nations of black Africa are beginning to look to their powerful southern neighbor for capital and for hope. As South Africa remakes itself, Mallaby says, it may be poised to take on a more constructive role on the continent.

Alice H. G. Phillips

A Complicated War:

The Harrowing of Mozambique

By William Finnegan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. 325 pp., \$25.00.

What—and where—is RENAMO? This question haunts William Finnegan's exploration of the extraordinarily destructive 16-year guerrilla war in Mozambique that ended in late 1991. Of his first visit to a town formerly occupied by the rebel organization created by Rhodesian military intelligence and fostered by Pretoria, Finnegan says in wonder, "There were few signs of battle. . . but a thousand relics of annihilative frenzy: each tile of a mosaic smashed, each pane of a glass-block wall painstakingly shattered." Finnegan interviews scores of Mozambicans who lost relatives, land, and parts of their bodies to RENAMO, experienced the group's special brand of terrorism, or served the *bandidos armados* (armed bandits), voluntarily or under coercion. But he never witnesses a RENAMO attack or really manages to pin down a movement whose fighters, many of their countrymen swear, are magic, even bulletproof.

The book is an account of two months' travel through war-torn Mozambique in 1988; the more peaceful present does not exist for it, so do not expect news. The work fashioned from Finnegan's beautifully clear and controlled prose has the feel of a literary text rather than journalism or scholarship (although the author's history and analysis are consistently keen, and there are 57 pages of notes at the end). One is not surprised to learn that much of the material originally appeared in *The New Yorker*. As in other lengthy pieces published there, almost every place and person mentioned merits a brief but highly polished physical description and history. Chance happenings and stray details are accorded as much weight as relevant ones. There is a certain detachment, and a strong ego behind it.

Finnegan's writing is so meticulous that his passion can surprise. He is cutting on the "development racket" in Mozambique—"the trendiest place on earth" for international organizations and aid workers, according to one of his subjects. After reporting on a conversation with one of the country's 3 million displaced people (out of a population of 16 million), who had worn only clothes made of tree bark for the last six years, Finnegan says, with understanding for the victims and an uncomfortable sense of his feeding on their loss, "The survival instincts developed by peasants being washed around in the murderous tides of a guerrilla war include, above all, the ability to sense quickly and accurately what any stronger being might want from them."

One of the understated themes of this book is that no one, least of all a Western journalist, could truly understand the war in Mozambique, which started out a tangle and devolved from there. Ultimately, Finnegan

seems to conclude, with deepened humanity, it is only the suffering voices of the individual people affected by the war that have substance.

A. P.

The Cold War Guerrilla: Jonas Savimbi, the U.S. Media, and the Angolan War

By Elaine Windrich. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992. 183 pp., \$45.00.

Dedicating her book to "the Angolan victims of the Reagan Doctrine," Elaine Windrich is determined to lay before the corporate offices of the American media and Republican policymakers their share of the guilt for the long and savage war in Angola.

Although a history of the "dirty war" in Angola, which the Reagan and Bush administrations supported along with South Africa, or a biography of rebel leader Jonas Savimbi would have been of general interest, *The Cold War Guerrilla* is neither. It is instead a textbook study of the treatment of Savimbi's organization, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and, secondarily, of the Angolan war itself, in the print media in the United States (Angola not possessing "the right stuff" for television). It spends most of its time going through piles of print, especially right-wing publications, digging up examples of deception, journalistic bias, incompetence, credulity, incorrect emphasis, and other sins; it also, less successfully, attempts to show how cold warriors and lobbyists such as Lee Atwater's public relations firm contributed to UNITA's effort to slant press coverage.

Readers who would relish a good exposé of the media conspiracy in this country will be disappointed, since most of the mainstream publications seem to have erred in their early coverage out of naiveté, to have taken some steps to correct it later, and in any case to have covered their backs all down the line. It is, however, eerie to revisit the "cold war context" and hear Reagan's UN ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick, again laud Savimbi as "[o]ne of the few authentic heroes of our time" when his movement's crimes embrace murder, disappearances, torture, urban terrorism, hostage-taking, action against aid workers, and atrocities against children—although Windrich only lists these, being occupied here with journalistic misdeeds.

While revealing the mistakes and worse of UNITA supporters, Windrich makes no effort to present a well-rounded picture. She mentions that the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which won control of the government by military means in 1975 and emerged with the most votes in an election held last year, has been cited for human rights violations, but leaves it that vague. Of course, one reason UNITA received more favorable press coverage than it merited was that it talked to and flattered the press when the government wouldn't. There's a lesson there.

A. P. ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

MARCH 1993

INTERNATIONAL

International Atomic Energy Agency
(See *Korea, North*)

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank)
(See *Kenya*)

Palestine Liberation Organization
(See *Lebanon*)

United Nations (UN)
(See also *Bosnia and Herzegovina; Cambodia; El Salvador*)
March 3—The Security Council calls for an immediate halt to "killings and atrocities" by Serb forces in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina and asks Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to move peacekeeping forces to the area.

March 26—By unanimous vote, the Security Council authorizes a UN operation in Somalia that will by May 1 replace the US-led multinational mission in the country; some 28,000 soldiers, including 5,000 US support troops and 2,000 marines stationed offshore, will complete the disarming of factional fighters, distribute relief supplies, enforce the UN arms embargo, and help rebuild the country; 2,800 UN civilian staffers will administer Somalia; it is estimated the mission will cost \$1.5 billion for the 1st year; this is the 1st UN mission that allows the use of force whenever necessary. The pact does not apply to Somaliland in northern Somalia, which Issak leaders have declared an independent country.
March 31—The Security Council votes unanimously to authorize NATO forces to shoot down planes that violate the UN ban on military flights over Bosnia; China abstains.

AFGHANISTAN

March 2—Government and rebel forces agree to a cease-fire and pledge to place their heavy weapons under a central military command; since the fall of the Communist government in April 1992, approximately 5,000 people have died and 750,000 have been displaced as a result of fighting.

March 7—In Islamabad, Pakistan, leaders of the 10 principal factions that brought down the Communist government ratify a power-sharing agreement between President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the head of Hezb-i-Islami, the group that has been responsible for most of the fighting in the country since the overthrow; Rabbani will continue as president and Hekmatyar will become prime minister; elections are to be held in 18 months.

ALGERIA

March 2—Security forces kill 9 Muslim fundamentalists after chasing their van near Tipaza, 38 miles west of Algiers.
March 27—The government severs diplomatic relations with Iran and recalls its ambassador to Sudan; it cites "interference" by the 2 countries in Algeria's internal affairs

and their support for Islamic militants as the reasons for the actions.

March 30—The state news agency reports government forces have located and killed 23 militants believed to have been involved in a March 22 attack on a military barracks in which 18 soldiers died.

ANDORRA

March 14—By more than a 3-to-1 margin, voters approve the country's 1st constitution, which establishes 3 branches of government with a clear separation of powers; the president of France and Spain's bishop of Urgel, who have been joint heads of state since the 13th century, will become ceremonial princes; the judiciary and foreign policy will now be run by Andorra; all 9,123 of the country's eligible voters cast ballots.

ANGOLA

March 7—Huambo, the country's 2d-largest city, is captured by National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) guerrillas; about 15,000 people are believed to have been killed in the 2-month battle for the city.

March 20—A military official reports government forces have recaptured M'banza Congo, the capital of Zaire province, 130 miles from the oil center of Soyo, which was reoccupied by government troops 1 week ago; foreign oil companies shut down their operations in Soyo in January when UNITA troops took the city.

AUSTRALIA

March 13—The left-of-center Labor party under Paul Keating, prime minister since 1991, wins national parliamentary elections with 52% of the overall vote against John Hewson's Liberal-National coalition; with most of the vote counted, it appears Labor received at least a 15-seat majority in the 147-member House of Representatives; Keating last month pledged to end ties with the British monarchy and convert Australia into a republic.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

(See also *Intl, UN*)

March 1—US officials say that as much as two-thirds of the supplies airdropped by the US yesterday near the eastern town of Cerska has been taken by Serb forces—backed by the Yugoslav army—that are besieging the area.

March 2—Government radio announces Cerska has fallen to the Serbs.

A UN official says 6,000 Muslims have been driven from their homes in the area around the north-central town of Banja Luka by Serb forces and are moving toward Travnik; in Zagreb, Croatia, a UN relief official says 2,000 Muslim refugees have arrived in Turbe, near Travnik, after being expelled from the Jajce area by Serb forces.

March 3—US Defense Secretary Les Aspin announces that US planes will halt the airdrop of relief supplies into eastern Bosnia because ground convoys have reached the Muslim enclaves there; a UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-

HCR) spokesman in Tuzla, however, says no convoys have been allowed in.

March 5—British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said in New York this week that between 2,000 and 3,000 people died from cold and hunger in Bosnia this winter, *The New York Times* reports; last year UNHCR and the World Health Organization warned as many as 400,000 people would be at risk from lack of fuel and food.

March 6—Ham radio operators from the eastern towns of Srebrenica and Konjevic say most of the 27 tons of relief supplies from the latest airdrop by American planes have reached their mark.

March 12—In Konjevic Polje, Serb forces shell a group of civilians surrounding 2 British UN armored personnel carriers, killing 20 people and injuring at least 6 others.

March 13—In a radio broadcast from Srebrenica, French General Philippe Morillon, the commander of UN military forces in Bosnia, announces he intends to remain in the town until Serb forces besieging it allow relief convoys to enter and permit the evacuation of hundreds of sick and wounded.

March 16—UN officials say Serb forces staged air raids on the villages of Gladovici and Osatica March 13; the raids violated the ban on military flights over the country approved by the UN Security Council last October.

March 19—A UN convoy carrying 175 tons of relief supplies arrives in Srebrenica.

March 22—Sarajevo officials put the death toll from the last 5 days of shelling by Serb forces at 150, with 500 people wounded.

March 24—The UN suspends an airlift of sick and wounded from Srebrenica after 2 Muslim civilians are killed and 2 Canadian UN troops are wounded by Serb artillery fire; 21 people were evacuated before the suspension.

March 28—In Srebrenica, a convoy of 20 UN trucks carrying 200 tons of relief supplies arrives after being delayed several days by Serb militias.

In Sarajevo, 3 people are killed and 5 wounded by Serb artillery fire 5 minutes before a UN-brokered cease-fire takes effect.

March 31—Approximately 4,300 Muslim refugees have been evacuated from Srebrenica to Tuzla in the last several days; 12 people have died during the operation.

BRAZIL

March 8—As many as 3,000 miners have been evacuated in the last 10 days from lands belonging to the Yanomami tribe in the Amazon region, *The New York Times* reports; the airlift is part of a plan to protect lands belonging to the indigenous people.

CAMBODIA

March 1—A spokesman for the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia says it has found only 3 soldiers who were serving in the Vietnamese army when it invaded Cambodia in 1978 and who presently serve with government forces; the rebel Khmer Rouge has repeatedly stalled peace talks, saying it will not participate because it believes there are thousands of Vietnamese soldiers still in the country.

March 10—At least 34 Vietnamese residents of a village in northwest Cambodia are killed by unidentified attackers; 29 are wounded; 1 attacker is killed by a villager; this is the 5th and largest mass killing of Vietnamese since last July; 3 of the previous 4 attacks have been linked to the Khmer Rouge.

March 20—A UN official announces 6,500 landmines of the approximately 3 million laid by all warring sides have been destroyed and as much as 1.7 million square meters has been demined as part of the 1991 Paris peace agreement; he

also says about 500 incidents involving landmines occur monthly.

CHINA

March 11—In its recently released report on China, the US-based human rights group Asia Watch says the government surreptitiously arrested more than 40 dissidents and destroyed at least 7 underground political organizations last year, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* reports; it also notes that 26 journalists and several thousand activists are still imprisoned and that some of those who had contact with dissident Shen Tong since his return from the US have also been arrested.

March 16—In a budget address before the National People's Congress, whose annual session opened yesterday, Finance Minister Liu Zhongli discloses that military spending will increase this year to \$7.4 billion—almost double that for 1988.

March 27—The Congress elects Jiang Zemin, the general secretary of the Communist party, as the country's president, and reelects him chairman of the Central Military Commission; this is the 1st time since the late 1970s that the top posts in the party, government, and military have been concentrated in 1 leader's hands. Rong Yiron, the chairman of a state-owned investment company, is named vice president.

March 31—The Congress adjourns after reelecting Li Peng, the sole candidate, to a 2d 5-year term as prime minister.

COLOMBIA

March 3—Police say escaped drug trafficker Pablo Escobar is responsible for a February 25 car bomb explosion in downtown Medellín that wounded 40 people; they have also held him responsible for 8 other car bomb explosions in the last 6 weeks that have killed 43 people and wounded 275.

March 13—In the town of Cúcuta, gunmen kill Eustorgio Colmenares Baptista, founder and editor of the daily newspaper *La Opinión*; Colmenares is the 100th journalist to be slain in the country since August 1987.

March 19—Police announce they have killed Mario Castaño Molina, Escobar's 2d-in-command, in Medellín.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

(See also *Georgia*)

March 11—At a special session of Russia's 1,033-member Congress of People's Deputies, legislators cancel a national referendum scheduled for next month on a new constitution and the distribution of government powers; Russian President Boris Yeltsin must now share the right to initiate legislation with the Council of Ministers, and may be impeached for actions deemed unconstitutional.

March 15—Yeltsin signs a decree transferring Russian army headquarters in the Caucasus region from Tbilisi, Georgia's capital, to Stavropol, in Russia; the decree also orders the creation of a rapid deployment force for the region.

March 20—In a televised speech, Yeltsin announces that because of the "undemocratic" nature of the Congress and an imminent "attack" by the former party nomenklatura, he is assuming virtually unlimited power to rule by decree until April 25; he says a vote of confidence on him and Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi will be held that day, and that Russians will vote as well on a draft constitution and a draft law for national elections for a new parliament.

Within the hour, Rutskoi and Valery Zorkin, the head of Russia's Constitutional Court, appear before the leadership of the Supreme Soviet to condemn the president's action; Rutskoi tells them he refused to sign Yeltsin's statement, while Zorkin says it violates the constitution in 18 ways.

March 23—After all-night deliberations, the Constitutional Court, in a 10-3 ruling, finds that Yeltsin's declaration of presidential "special rule" is not supported by the constitution; the court worked without any documents—including the official order—or hearing any arguments.

March 24—The presidential order announced 4 days ago is finally published; it no longer contains mention of "special rule," and says challenges to Yeltsin's decrees by another branch of government would be invalid "without a ruling of the Constitutional Court."

March 26—Appearing before a new extraordinary session of the Russian parliament, which has been called to investigate his actions, Yeltsin says all 3 branches of government have committed many constitutional violations; he acknowledges his government made "mistakes" in economic policy, including insufficient attention to reform's effect on citizens and an overreliance on foreign aid; he dismisses the ministers of finance and economy and names deputy prime minister Boris Fyodorov, the chief government economist, as the new finance minister.

March 28—In secret balloting at the Congress of People's Deputies, a measure to remove Yeltsin from office fails narrowly, with 617 of the legislators—only 72 fewer than the two-thirds required—voting against the president. After Ruslan Khasbulatov announces a proposed compromise with Yeltsin, deputies attempt to oust him as speaker; the resolution garners 339 of the simple majority of 517 votes required.

March 29—The Russian parliament approves a referendum to be held April 25 that will ask voters whether they have confidence in Yeltsin, whether they approve of the government's economic and social policies, and whether they consider early elections for president and the Congress necessary. The parliament approves other measures aimed against Yeltsin, including ones ordering a coalition government, suspending his decrees, and dismissing his regional representatives. A group of 42 liberal deputies announce they will boycott the rest of the session.

CONGO

March 1—Police report that 147 Zairian deportees have drowned in the Congo River when a ferryboat gangway collapsed; the government has told the thousands of illegal aliens in the country, including Zairians who fled to Congo after a January army revolt, that they must leave by March 5.

CROATIA

March 29—Prime Minister Hrvoje Sarinic and his cabinet resign; President Franjo Tudjman nominates Nikica Valentec, who heads the state-owned oil company, to replace Sarinic.

EGYPT

March 6—In Aswan, 1 police officer is killed and another wounded in an attack by Islamic militants.

March 10—Fifteen militants were killed in 2 raids in Cairo and in Aswan last night and today, Interior Ministry officials say; 3 police officers and 3 civilians were also killed and about 24 others wounded in the largest crackdown since President Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981.

March 16—In Cairo, a bomb explosion damages 4 buses outside the Egyptian Museum; government officials blame militants for the blast. The March 13 *Economist* quotes a defense lawyer at 1 of the recent mass trials of militants as saying that 6,000 militants are now in detention in the country.

March 17—During a raid by police in Asyut, 10 fundamentalists are killed and 11 others wounded; police officials say 25 militants were arrested in the operation, in which 1 police officer was killed and 10 others wounded.

March 27—In Cairo, 1 police officer is killed and 7 people wounded by a bomb explosion; police officials say Islamic militants are responsible for the blast.

EL SALVADOR

March 12—Defense Minister General René Emilio Ponce submits his resignation.

March 15—A UN-sponsored panel responsible for investigating human rights abuses in El Salvador releases a report that calls for the dismissal of high-ranking military officers and prohibitions against government and rebel officials holding political office for a period of 10 years; the commission, which investigated as many as 22,000 cases of serious violence that occurred during the country's 12-year civil war, determines that the involvement of the US-trained Atlacatl battalion as well as other army units in atrocities—such as the wholesale slaughter of civilians—has been "sufficiently proven"; it also recommends the overhaul of the Salvadoran military.

March 20—The government announces a sweeping amnesty for those implicated in human rights abuses during the civil war, including members of the army, the government, and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front.

FRANCE

March 22—Final results from yesterday's 1st round of parliamentary elections show the governing Socialist party, which captured 34.7% of the vote in 1988, received only 17.6%; the conservative Union for France coalition won the round, with 39.5%.

March 30—Final results from runoff elections held March 28 show the Union for France won 484 seats in the 577-member National Assembly; the Socialists won 70, while the far-right National Front and an environmental coalition failed to take any. President François Mitterrand names as prime minister Edouard Balladur of the Rally for the Republic, the senior partner in the winning conservative coalition.

GEORGIA

(See also CIS)

March 15—Spokesmen for Georgia say 107 people in Sukhumi were killed in bombing raids they claim were conducted by Russian warplanes in preparation for an offensive by secessionists to recapture the Abkhazian capital; government troops occupied Sukhumi last August.

March 17—In a televised address, Eduard Shevardnadze, head of Georgia's governing State Council, asks citizens to donate guns to fight separatists in the autonomous republic of Abkhazia, and accuses hard-liners in the Russian military of providing troops and weapons to the rebels; intense fighting is reported in Sukhumi.

HAITI

(See US)

INDIA

March 1—Parliament extends India's rule over the state of Jammu and Kashmir another 6 months; United News of India reports no one was injured in a firefight between Indian and Pakistani soldiers earlier today in the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled areas of Kashmir.

March 12—A series of 11 bombs at the Bombay Stock Exchange and Air India office towers and other locations around India's business capital kill 317 people and wound about 1,100; no group takes responsibility.

March 17—An explosion in a low-income neighborhood in Calcutta caused by stored explosives smuggled into the city kills 86 people.

INDONESIA

March 11—The People's Consultative Assembly elects Try Sutrisno, who has just retired as head of the armed forces, vice president. The body yesterday voted unanimously to return 71-year-old President Suharto to a 6th 5-year term.

IRAN

(See also *Algeria; Iraq; US; Zambia*)

March 16—In Rome, Mohammed Hussein Nagdi, head of the opposition National Council of Resistance of Iran, is slain by unidentified gunmen.

IRAQ

(See also *Zambia*)

March 13—Kurdistan Front officials say 20 Iraqi intelligence agents killed more than 30 Kurds and wounded 15 others in a raid on the northern village of Aweina yesterday.

Representatives of the Iranian Democratic party, a Kurdish group, say an attack today by 6 Iranian planes on its base in northeastern Iraq, near the border with Iran, left 4 people dead and several others wounded.

IRELAND

March 28—An estimated 20,000 people attend a rally in Dublin to condemn recent bombings in England by the Irish Republican Army.

ISRAEL

(See also *Lebanon*)

March 1—In Tel Aviv, a Palestinian stabs and kills 2 Israelis and wounds 8 others before being beaten by a crowd of bystanders and then arrested; the army announces it will seal off the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip, where the assailant lived, for an indefinite period beginning tomorrow.

March 7—Army officials say Gaza will be reopened tomorrow.

March 24—Ezer Weizman is elected the 7th president of Israel by a 66-53 vote in parliament, with 1 abstention; he will replace President Chaim Herzog on May 13.

Benjamin Netanyahu is elected head of the Likud bloc in party primaries.

March 28—The army announces it will seal off Gaza beginning tomorrow; at least 8 Israelis and 14 Palestinians have been killed in the West Bank and Gaza since March 1.

March 29—In Gaza, another Israeli settler is stabbed to death by a Palestinian.

March 30—In Hadera, 2 police officers are shot and killed; the Islamic militant group Hamas takes responsibility.

The government orders the West Bank sealed for an indefinite period.

ITALY

March 9—Justice officials in Milan announce the arrest of Gabriele Cagliari, the head of the state-owned energy conglomerate, as well as the director of the conglomerate's subsidiary in Florence in connection with the "clean hands" bribery and corruption scandal. Last weekend, after public protests, President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro declined to sign into law a decree backed by Prime Minister Giuliano Amato's government that would have allowed some officials involved in the scandal to escape jail sentences if they confessed, resigned from office, and paid a fine several times the amount they

received in bribes; Minister for the Environment Carlo Ripa De Meana resigned March 7 to protest the decree.

March 16—Renato Altissimo, the head of the Liberal party, which is a junior member of the coalition government, resigns from his party position after magistrates notify him he is under investigation for accepting bribes worth \$35,000 from the state electricity utility in exchange for help in obtaining a contract.

March 27—Giulio Andreotti, who has served 7 times as prime minister and is now a senator for life, announces he is under official investigation by magistrates in Palermo for alleged association with the Mafia; he declares his innocence, and impugns the testimony of Mafia informers on which the case against him rests.

March 30—Finance Minister Franco Reviglio resigns after being informed he is under investigation on suspicion of receiving stolen goods while head of the state-owned energy conglomerate in the 1980s.

Authorities announce the arrest of almost 300 people in Naples and Reggio Calabria on bribery charges in connection with public works contracts.

JAPAN

March 13—Tokyo prosecutors indict Shin Kanemaru and his onetime political secretary, Masahisa Haibara, on charges they evaded more than \$2 million in taxes in 1987 on donations to secret political accounts under their control. Kanemaru resigned as vice president of the governing Liberal Democratic party last year after he admitted accepting nearly \$4 million in illegal contributions; he later resigned from parliament after being linked with organized crime figures. Both men have been detained.

KENYA

March 22—Little more than a month after implementing economic policies agreed on with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, including the lifting of price controls and restrictions on foreign currency earnings, President Daniel arap Moi announces the government is revoking the "cruel, dictatorial and unrealistic" changes; Western donors suspended \$350 million in aid in November 1991.

KOREA, NORTH

(See also *Korea, South*)

March 12—North Korea announces it is withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it signed in 1985; the International Atomic Energy Agency had given the country until March 25 to comply with the treaty by granting inspectors access to 2 secret sites believed to be used for plutonium production; North Korea is suspected of having produced enough high-grade plutonium for a nuclear bomb.

KOREA, SOUTH

March 6—President Kim Young Sam, who last month took office as head of the country's 1st civilian government in more than 30 years, grants amnesty to some 41,000 criminals and dissidents. Kim says the move signals a fresh start in the country's politics.

March 15—In response to North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Kim announces he has ordered a halt to all government and private plans to invest in North Korea.

LEBANON

March 6—In the Ain Hilwe refugee camp, 2 Israeli helicopters destroy with rockets a building believed to be the headquar-

ters for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine guerrilla group.

The head of the local training center for the PLO's mainstream Fatah faction, Lieutenant Colonel Ali Abdel Rahman, is killed, and 2 of his associates are wounded by unidentified gunmen as they leave Ain Hilwe.

MEXICO

March 30—The head of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), Genaro Borrego Estrada, steps down and is replaced by the PRI leader in the lower house of Congress, Fernando Ortiz Arana; the move follows a cabinet shuffle yesterday by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in which 1 minister was removed and another replaced.

PAKISTAN

(See India)

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

March 15—On the island of Bougainville, 1 government soldier and 4 guerrillas belonging to the separatist Bougainville Republican Army are killed in a shootout.

PERU

March 29—Justice Minister Fernando Vega announces that 32 prisoners—most of them members of the Maoist Shining Path rebel group—escaped yesterday from a prison in the San Gerónimo district near Cuzco after guerrillas exploded a car bomb that blew a hole in a prison wall; 3 prisoners and 1 police officer were killed in a shootout following the jail-break.

SENEGAL

March 13—Ruling on charges that the election held 3 weeks ago was rigged by the governing Socialist party, the constitutional court says President Abdou Diouf was reelected, with 58.4% of the vote; the court says his main challenger, Abdoulaye Wade, received 32%.

SOMALIA

(See also Intl, UN)

March 2—Three people are killed and 16 wounded by hand grenades in the southern port of Kismayu, where looting and violence between clans have been continuing for a week.

March 3—A US soldier is killed by a landmine; he is the 6th American to be killed in the US-led operation in Somalia.

March 16—In Kismayu, at least 50 people are reported wounded in fighting between troops loyal to Mohammed Said Hersi, known as General Morgan, and those of Colonel Omar Jess, an ally of General Mohammed Farah Aidid, 1 of the country's 2 most powerful warlords; the UN is investigating the cease-fire violations.

March 27—After 13 days of talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, leaders of Somalia's 15 warring factions sign an agreement that would give the country its 1st government since dictator Mohammed Siad Barre was ousted in January 1991; the pact calls for a 94-member transitional council to govern Somalia until the formation of a national government within 2 years.

SOUTH AFRICA

March 5—Ten blacks are killed in an attack on a van near Pietermaritzburg in Natal province. Six black children riding in a truck were killed in the same area on March 2 in an ambush that also wounded 7; Inkatha Freedom party spokes-

men said 5 of the victims were children of senior party officials; the African National Congress denies Inkatha allegations that it was responsible.

March 24—In an address before the parliament, President F. W. de Klerk discloses that South Africa built 6 crude atomic bombs in a program that began in 1974; he says the program was halted in 1989 after he took office, and that the bombs were dismantled, the uranium fuel downgraded, and the blueprints destroyed; the bombs, he says, were intended only as threats to force US aid in the event South Africa was attacked by Soviet-backed forces; he also says no other country helped construct the weapons.

SUDAN

(See Algeria)

UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

Great Britain

(See also Ireland)

March 25—A 2d victim dies of his wounds after 2 bombings March 20 in the northwest city of Warrington that also wounded 56 people, many of them seriously; the Irish Republican Army has taken responsibility for the bombings.

UNITED STATES (US)

(See also Intl, UN; Bosnia and Herzegovina; El Salvador; Somalia)

March 5—The State Department issues a statement naming Iran "the most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism" in the world, citing Iranian involvement with assassinations and bombings in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.

March 16—In Washington, ousted Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide meets with President Bill Clinton to discuss his return to Haiti; it is the first time since Aristide was removed from power by the Haitian military in September 1991 that he has met with a US president.

March 27—In New York, law enforcement officials say that a letter sent to *The New York Times* by a group claiming responsibility for the February bombing of the World Trade Center is authentic; officials say 1 of the 5 Arab men arrested this month for the bombing wrote the letter for the group, which calls itself the Liberation Army Fifth Battalion; the letter said the bombing, which killed 6 people, was to protest US policy in the Middle East.

YUGOSLAVIA

March 17—In Washington, US officials say a ship sailing under the Liberian flag recently delivered about 50,000 metric tons of gasoline to Yugoslavia, violating the total economic embargo the UN imposed against the country last May.

ZAIRE


(See also Congo)

March 9—Members of the interim government of Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi boycott talks scheduled with President Mobutu Sese Seko; the president is seeking permission from the High Council to dismiss Tshisekedi.

Mobutu convenes a "political conclave" that chooses Faustin Birindwa as the new prime minister.

ZAMBIA

March 20—Fearing a coup plot, President Frederick Chiluba declared a state of emergency on March 4; 23 people have been arrested without charges and the ambassadors from Iraq and Iran have been expelled, *The Economist* reports. ■



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